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ABSTRACT—Approximately three decades ago, two of us, Terrell Carter and
Kempis Songster, were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that this sentence, effectively an
order to die in prison, represented a legal determination that we were
irredeemable. In this Article, with insights from our coauthor and friend,
human rights scholar Rachel López, we ask: What does it mean for the law
to judge some human beings as incapable of redemption? Isn’t the capacity
for change core to the human condition, and shouldn’t that be reflected in the
law?
This Article marries human rights law with our lived experience to
argue that the capacity for redemption is an innate human characteristic. By
documenting the dehumanizing effect of codified condemnation and the
struggle for humanity after a person has been found irredeemable in a court
of law, we seek to show why all humans should have a legal right to
redemption—a right embedded in the Eighth Amendment through the latent
concept of human dignity.
The reading of the Eighth Amendment we call for would require a
dramatic reimagination of the U.S. criminal legal system into one that
elevates humanity, not deprives it. One that creates the opportunity for
healing and human development, not denies it. One that facilitates the human
capacity for redemption, not forbids it. One, in other words, that recognizes
that change is always possible.
Redeeming justice thus requires that legal systems not make unalterable
decisions about a human being’s capacity for change. At a bare minimum,
this means that all sentences should be reviewable, with release possible after
someone redeems herself. No person should be permanently deprived of her
hope for freedom.
AUTHORS—Terrell Carter is currently on his twenty-ninth year of a deathby-incarceration prison sentence. He is the author of three published novels
and a graduate of Villanova University. Rachel López is an Associate
Professor of Law at the Thomas R. Kline School of Law at Drexel University
and a Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard
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Kennedy School. Kempis Songster served thirty years in prison before being
resentenced and finally released pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that mandatory life
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. He now lives in
Philadelphia with his wife and son and is the Director of the Healing Futures
Restorative Justice Diversion Program, a partnership between the Youth Art
& Self-Empowerment Project and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
Office.
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INTRODUCTION
“Do you think that there are any human beings who are not capable of
redemption?” queried Justice Samuel Alito during oral argument on Election
Day in November 2020.1 Before the U.S. Supreme Court was the case of
Brett Jones, who had been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) at age fifteen.2 The Court was deciding whether, because
Jones was a juvenile, his judge was required to find him “permanently
incorrigible,” in essence incapable of rehabilitation, before imposing that
sentence on him.3

1 Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Examines When Juveniles May Be Sentenced to Life Without
Parole, NPR (Nov. 3, 2020, 5:13 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.npr.org/
2020/11/03/930892945/supreme-court-examines-when-juveniles-may-be-sentenced-to-life-withoutparole?t=1604835753796 [https://perma.cc/P5GX-BXDH].
2 Id.
3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259),
2019 WL 1453516, at *i. The petitioner argued that a finding of permanent incorrigibility was required
after Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016), which specified that sentencing juvenile
defendants to LWOP was prohibited “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes
reflect permanent incorrigibility.”
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So, what to make of Justice Alito’s question: Are there some humans
who are incapable of redemption? Two of us have been told that we were.
Sentenced to LWOP nearly three decades ago, we were deemed
irredeemable in a court of law. To use the Supreme Court’s own words, our
sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” 4 It was “an
irrevocable judgment about [our] value and place in society.”5 We were said
to have no value to add to and no place in free society. To us, such a sentence
feels more like death than life and is more aptly called death by incarceration,
or DBI.
We adamantly resist such legally codified condemnation. The capacity
for change is, as we will demonstrate below, core to the human condition,
and all people, regardless of their age, should have a basic human right to
pursue personal redemption. It is our conviction that all humans have the
inner capacity to forgive and be forgiven, to transform and be transformed,
and that the law should reflect these innate qualities6—that all human beings
have a right to redemption.
How do we know this? Because we have changed.7 Our lives expose
the flaws in these unalterable decisions about the human capacity for change.
Our paths to redemption crack the veneer of this legally codified
condemnation. Through a collective process with other incarcerated
individuals, we formed the Right to Redemption Committee (R2R
Committee or Committee) and struggled to come to terms with past wrongs,
finding a path to redemption in a legal system that saw none. The Committee
discovered that redemption was not something that the state could give or
take away. Rather, redemption is only realized through personal
responsibility and growth. While understanding that redemption is deeply
personal and individualized, we witnessed how the state, as the custodian of
liberty, had the power either to obstruct or, alternatively, to facilitate, a path

4 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012) (quoting
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
5 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added).
6 This understanding of redemption was forged with the insights of Angelys Torres, Sara Curley, and
Reece McGovern, who worked closely with members of the Right to Redemption Committee as law
students in the Andy and Gwen Stern Community Lawyering Clinic.
7 In this way, we are drawing from the tradition of critical race theory (CRT), which often employs
“legal storytelling” to offer “counter-accounts of social reality by subversive and subaltern elements of
the reigning order.” Julia Hernandez, Lawyering Close to Home, 27 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 135 (2020)
(first citing RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 178
(3d ed. 2017); then citing CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
at xiii (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); and then citing
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2437–38 (1989)).
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towards redemption. The law can either restore faith and hope in second
chances, or it can deny them.
*

*

*

After three decades of serving a DBI sentence, I (Kempis Songster,
known as Ghani to my friends) had my redemption legally recognized by the
state. After the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Miller v. Alabama that
mandatory life sentences for juveniles amount to cruel and unusual
punishment, 8 I was one of 224 people to be resentenced and ultimately
released in Pennsylvania, the state with the highest number of people
sentenced as juveniles to life in prison.9 Once deemed so dangerous that I
could never be free, I am now fully devoted to restorative-justice practices
and direct Healing Futures, a diversion program for youth created as a
partnership between the Youth Art & Self-Empowerment Project (YASP)
and the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. I have never committed
another crime.
I am not alone. A 2020 study conducted by researchers at Montclair
State University found that only 1.14% of the 174 people released in
Philadelphia post-Miller have recidivated. 10 Put another way, the state’s
initial instinct about these offenders’ possibility for redemption was wrong
nearly 99% of the time. This finding contradicts fixed understandings of the
dangerousness of “violent offenders” that permeate the law. It also raises
considerable doubt about the state’s aptitude to make static determinations
about future dangerousness at the time of sentencing.
Our coauthor, Terrell Carter, affectionately known as Rell, remains
behind bars because he was twenty-two years old at the time of his crime.11
He is a living testament to how flawed the state’s predetermined assessments
of future worth and redeemability are, but I will let Rell speak for himself.
8

See 567 U.S. 460, 490 (2012).
Andrea Finney, Juvenile Lifers Back in Society, Paving Way for Release of Other Young Offenders,
CBS LOC. 21 NEWS (Jan. 27, 2020), https://local21news.com/news/local/juvenile-lifers-back-in-societypaving-way-for-release-of-other-young-offenders [https://perma.cc/6AF4-T2U7].
10 TARIKA DAFTARY-KAPUR & TINA ZOTTOLI, MONTCLAIR STATE UNIV., RESENTENCING OF
JUVENILE LIFERS: THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIENCE 10 (2020), https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=justice-studies-facpubs [https://perma.cc/CBN9-CZPE].
11 Neuroscientists have concluded that humans do not reach full social and emotional maturity at that
age. See Lucy Wallis, Is 25 the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24173194 [https://perma.cc/9P24-P2DE]; cf. M. Brent Donnellan,
Xiaojia Ge & Ernst Wenk, Cognitive Abilities in Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Criminal
Offenders, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 396, 398 (2000) (considering individuals as adolescent-limited
offenders “if the first arrest occurred after age 17 and commission of criminal offenses stopped by the
age of 25” because delinquent juveniles “may have had an ‘extended’ adolescence due to incarceration”).
9

319

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

*

*

*

While incarcerated, I have been committed to becoming the best version
of myself. It hasn’t been easy. I struggled to come to grips with what I had
done because I was so focused on the unfairness of the judicial process that
it left no room for me to consider anything or anyone else. It wasn’t until I
had a conversation with my very good friend, Ghani, that I was finally able
to realize the impact of my actions. As we talked, Ghani could see that I was
having difficulty reconciling my accountability with the unfairness I
experienced in the judicial process, so he said to me, “Rell, imagine you have
a hearing that will determine whether or not you can get out of prison. What
you say to a panel of judges that will determine whether or not you should
be allowed to go home. It’s your time to speak, to convince these judges that
you deserve a second chance. Right before you utter a word, an elderly
woman stands up in the courtroom and says to you, ‘But you killed my son.’
What would you say to that mother?”
It was at that moment that I understood. At that moment the selfish
bubble that I had been living in burst wide open, exposing me to the pain that
I was responsible for bringing into the world. I realized that I didn’t exist in
a world populated by just me, that my actions had consequences that
stretched beyond myself and the moment in which they occurred. From then
on, I have been committed to becoming the best version of myself, which
would not have been possible had I not been able to come to grips with my
past wrongs.
Since that realization, I have used my time in prison to participate in
activities towards that end. I just recently graduated from Villanova
University, and I am currently in pursuit of a master’s degree. I’ve also
immersed myself in learning the art of creative writing so that I can tell my
story in hopes that my experiences can be the tools that someone can use to
save themselves. These learning experiences allowed me to grow, mature,
and realize my full potential. As the current chairman of the R2R Committee,
I use my position to mentor young men on the inside, to provide hospice care
to those with terminal illnesses, and generally to help as many people as
possible. This has become my purpose—my primary reason for being. Yet,
as this Article details, because of my determinate life sentence, the state has
no meaningful mechanism to modify my sentence to reflect the changes I
have made in my life, simply because I was over the age of eighteen at the
time of my crime.
*
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We founded the R2R Committee with others in State Correctional
Institution (SCI) Graterford, a state prison outside Philadelphia, as a vehicle
for challenging this legal damnation of the human capacity for change. 12
Because the Committee understood this capacity as a core part of humanity,
belonging not just to the incarcerated but to all members of the human
species, we adopted a human rights frame. That is not to say that everyone
will change, but rather that the right to redemption represents the principle
that if someone does redeem himself, then he should be considered for
release. 13 The Committee therefore concluded that our LWOP sentences
violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which bars cruel
and unusual punishment, because they infringed our human right to
redemption.14
Although we did not know it at the time of forming the R2R Committee,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a court that the U.S.
Supreme Court has looked to in the past for guidance,15 was simultaneously
conceptualizing a right strikingly congruent with the R2R Committee’s
independently conceived right to redemption. Specifically, the ECtHR held
that “it would be incompatible with . . . human dignity . . . to deprive a
person of his freedom forcefully without at least providing him with the
chance to regain that freedom one day.”16 For this reason, in the ECtHR’s
seminal case, Vinter v. United Kingdom, the court concluded that life
sentences must allow for the “reducibility of the sentence.” 17 More
concretely, all life sentences must be regularly reviewed in order to take into
account “any changes in the life prisoner” and “progress towards
rehabilitation” so significant that “detention can no longer be justified on
12 In this way, we view our scholarship as part of an emerging field of movement law scholarship
aimed at investigating and analyzing the law and legal systems alongside social movements. See Amna
A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 825 (2021)
(“In this Article, we [identify] a methodology for working alongside social movements within scholarly
work. We argue that legal scholars should take seriously the epistemological universe of today’s left
social movements, their imaginations, experiments, tactics, and strategies for legal and social change. We
call this methodology movement law. Movement law is not the study of social movements; rather, it is
investigation and analysis with social movements. Social movements are the partners of movement law
scholars rather than their subject.”).
13 See Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 39, 59 (2018).
14 We note the right to redemption is likely applicable to other lengthy sentences as well as the death
penalty but chose to focus our inquiry on LWOP because of Rell’s and Ghani’s lived experience with this
sentence.
15 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (examining analogous cases at the ECtHR,
such as Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), when holding that a Texas statute
making it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy
of their own home was unconstitutional).
16 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 347.
17 Id. at 349.
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legitimate penological grounds.” 18 The ECtHR found that a life sentence
amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if the sentence
holds no possibility of review or prospect of release.19
In subsequent cases, the ECtHR noted “a trend towards placing more
emphasis on rehabilitation” in criminal punishment. 20 This global trend
continues to grow. As we document in this Article, diverse jurisdictions
across the world are increasingly understanding life sentences that lack any
prospect of release and possibility of review as an affront to human dignity
and therefore constituting inhuman and degrading punishment.21 As of 2012,
LWOP sentences are only legal in thirty-eight of the world’s 193 countries.22
The Vatican has also removed the life sentence from its criminal code, with
Pope Francis calling it “a secret death penalty” and urging its abolition.23
This jurisprudence, reflecting the right to redemption and the broader
trend towards outlawing unalterable life sentences on the basis of human
dignity, is consequential in the context of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment. Significantly, it
places a redemptive reading of the Eighth Amendment within reach. The key
is the link to human dignity. As other legal scholars have underscored, the
concept of human dignity is latent in the Eighth Amendment. 24 This
embedded concept is the bedrock on which a redeeming justice could be
built. After all, understandings of the Eighth Amendment are not fixed in
time; they draw from “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”25 In evaluating the evolving standards of decency, the

18

Id.
See id. at 350. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS Art. 3 (1950).
20 Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 445.
21 See infra Section IV.C.
22 See CONNIE DE LA VEGA, AMANDA SOLTER, SOO-RYUN KWON & DANA MARIE ISAAC, CTR. FOR
L. & GLOB. JUST., UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. L., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT 25 (2012), http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archica/Cruel-And-Unusual_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GBE9-G6XG].
23 See Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on Fraternity and
Social Friendship, HOLY SEE (Oct. 3, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4EA-MJ6E]; see also Pope Francis, Address to the Delegates of the International
Association of Penal Law, HOLY SEE (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vatican.va/content/
francesco/en/speeches/2014/october/documents/papa-francesco_20141023_associazione-internazionalediritto-penale.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3FZ-SKAK] (“A life sentence is just a death penalty in disguise.”).
24 See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth
Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2140–42 (noting that the Court has described human dignity as
“the touchstone of the Amendment’s prohibition”).
25 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
19
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U.S. Supreme Court has looked to international and foreign jurisdictions for
instruction in the past.26 Consequently, the right to redemption, recognized
in other jurisdictions outside of the United States, could be read into the
latent concept of human dignity in the Eighth Amendment, thereby
intertwining conceptions of human dignity worldwide. In this way, the law
could be interpreted in a manner that affirms humanity rather than denies it.
Restoring hope, both in and through the law, is possible. In the current
moment, when many are questioning the underlying assumptions,
inequalities, and biases that have driven this country to become a carceral
state that imprisons 2.3 million people, 27 embracing this principle seems
more urgent than ever.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I memorializes our path to
redemption, collectively discovered with other members of the R2R
Committee. It speaks fundamental truths about the dehumanizing effect of
codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity when the state has
determined someone to be legally irredeemable. It also articulates the
Committee’s understanding of the right to redemption and how DBI denies
this human right. Part II traces the emergence of the redemptive rights in
human rights law that developed in parallel with the Committee’s
conceptualization of the right to redemption. It focuses in particular on the
robust jurisprudence in the ECtHR, which in many ways echoes the R2R
Committee’s understanding of the right. Part III demonstrates how the
United States is grossly out of line with these human rights standards. It
demonstrates this misalignment through a state-by-state analysis,
highlighting sentencing schemes in which the avenues for review and release
are particularly capricious, uncertain, and opaque. In total, we have identified
at least twenty-five jurisdictions in the United States that fail to meet
international human rights standards. Finally, Part IV sets a path forward for
redeeming justice in the United States. This last Part charts a way for the
right to redemption to be incorporated into and reconciled with existing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby giving substance to the Court’s
rhetorical evocation of human dignity in Eighth Amendment case law.
I.

THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION

Having been deemed irredeemable and condemned to die in prison, we
joined together with others in SCI Graterford, a state prison outside
Philadelphia, to develop a concept that would vindicate our humanity and
26

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005).
Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INST.
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/C665-89C6].
27
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defy our legally codified condemnation. Behind prison walls, an idea took
root that would motivate our lives’ mission: all human beings have the innate
capacity for change and consequently the right to redemption.28 Serving an
LWOP sentence, or DBI, felt like a daily affront to this right. The R2R
Committee soon concluded that the state making a one-time, irrevocable
damnation of our lifetime capacity for change was a violation of our human
rights, and we reflected this belief when drafting our mission statement, seen
in Figure 1. 29 Two years later, the ECtHR would come to the same
conclusion.
In this Part, written from the perspective of Rell and Ghani, we trace
the birth of the R2R Committee and the foundational ideas that emerged from
its members. We describe how the Committee conceptualized redemption
and its attendant rights. We also document the dehumanizing effect of
codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity in the face of a legal
system that told us that we were irredeemable. These personal accounts of
the U.S. criminal legal system reveal how indefinite confinement can
needlessly deny opportunities for the individual and communal righting of
past wrongs.

28

Other legal scholars have evoked redemption in the criminal law context, but we are the first to
argue that all human beings have a right to redemption, explicitly adopting a human rights frame. The
R2R Committee’s articulation of the right to redemption also predates this scholarship. See, e.g.,
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Right to Redemption: Juvenile Dispositions and Sentences, 77 LA. L. REV.
47, 72–73 (2016) (contending that those sentenced to LWOP as juveniles should have a right to
redemption); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 963, 963 (2013) (arguing for “a redemption-focused approach to criminal records”).
29 See RIGHT TO REDEMPTION, https://right2redemption.com/ [https://perma.cc/PU2W-KAPN].
Throughout this Article, we provide our understanding and characterization of R2R’s policies and
principles based on our close affiliation with the organization.
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FIGURE 1: RIGHT TO REDEMPTION MISSION STATEMENT

A. The Formation of the Right to Redemption Committee
In 2011, a group of dedicated men formed a new committee, the Right
to Redemption Committee, within Lifers Incorporated (Lifers Inc.) at one of

325

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Pennsylvania’s historically largest prisons, Graterford.30 At the time of its
inception, the morale of the men condemned to die behind Graterford’s fortyfoot walls was at an all-time low. During this period, there was an intense
sense of urgency because death had become a familiar occurrence. In the
early days of R2R, we were still relatively young men who were just
beginning to understand the inevitability of our sentences. At the time, it
seemed as if every other week one of the condemned would finally succumb,
his life journey ending in the misery of existing in a life stripped of all hope.
Time after time, we bore witness as the men we all knew, men whom we had
grown to love, men who mentored us and watched us with pride as we
matured into positive men in an extremely negative environment, were
wheeled out of their prison cells on stretchers, stiff and eyes dim. Prison
nurses and sometimes correctional officers frantically applied chest
compressions in a futile attempt to reignite the light in those dim eyes. But
the spark had dissipated, their life journeys coming to a close, bringing about
the promise of their court-ordered condemnation.
There was this unspoken truth that we all shared. We knew that if
nothing changed in the near future regarding our condition, then we would
all have to face the bleak reality of dying alone in prison, without ever having
the opportunity to try to make up for the harm that we caused. We all knew
that it was only a matter of time before each and every one of us would be
taking that sightless ride on a penitentiary gurney. This unspoken truth fueled
the urgency that brought us together—a group of men who made a
commitment to ourselves, to each other, and to the nearly 4,500 souls
condemned to die in Pennsylvania’s prisons,31 to do whatever we could to
help bring about an end to the inhuman practice of sentencing human beings
to DBI.
At the time of R2R’s formation, the Graterford chapter of Lifers Inc. as
described by then-president Mr. Wayne Battle when he recruited us to the
R2R Committee, was in a state of flux—lost. After year upon year of failing
to secure parole eligibility, a disease of complacency set in. There was this
insidious, subconscious loss of hope that slowly eroded the joy of life and
drained the energy necessary for the monumental struggle of ending LWOP
prison sentences. We had become lost in the how-to and blind to the fact that
30

Lifers Inc. is an organization formed by incarcerated people in order to secure parole eligibility
for those serving mandatory LWOP sentences in Pennsylvania. See LIFERS INC.,
https://www.lifersincpa.org [https://perma.cc/ZBC3-36YP]. Graterford closed in 2018 and was replaced
by a new facility at the same location. See SCI Phoenix, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/
Facilities/StatePrisons/Pages/Phoenix.aspx [https://perma.cc/82P6-ZLHQ].
31 ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 8 (2009), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/no-exit-the-expanding-use-of-lifesentences-in-america [https://perma.cc/4LP6-JT2L].
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the means had become the end, and the actual goal of abolishing mandatory
LWOP became a moving target that was becoming more and more distant.
In a moment of clarity, Mr. Battle shook off the malaise of failure and
became determined to get the organization back on track. He believed that
the best way to do so would be by forming a new committee that would focus
exclusively on securing parole eligibility for the thousands sentenced to
mandatory LWOP prison sentences. With Mr. Battle’s newfound
determination and narrowed focus, the R2R Committee was born.
Once formed, our group’s first task was to figure out what its core
values would be. What would be the space from which we would operate?
Who did we want to be? One of the few things that we knew at that point
was that we had to take a different approach than the one that had brought
nothing but failure and death—an approach that for decades had provided no
relief for the thousands of men, women, and children condemned to spend
the rest of their lives in prison.
In the conversations that ensued, the very first thing that we realized
was the importance of language—how we were existing in a language that
created a prison within a prison. We realized that language shaped our reality
and that the first wall that had to be deconstructed was the one language built
within us, through the words that we used to describe ourselves and our
condition. Through these months-long, extremely intense conversations, we
came to recognize the difficulty of condemning someone if you can see your
humanity reflected in him. We began to see how the terms that we used to
describe ourselves and our struggle removed us from the ranks of humanity,
making it virtually impossible for people to see a reflection of their humanity
when they looked at us. We saw how we became the “other,” not belonging
to the human family, thereby somehow deserving to be thrown away and
discarded forever. We saw that if we continued to use others’ definitions of
who we were, then no matter how far removed we were from the people who
caused so much pain, no matter how much we transformed, no matter the
determination that we had to be the best versions of ourselves, no matter the
certificates, the degrees, and the lives that we affected in positive ways, we
would always be chained and shackled to the worst moments of our lives.
We became acutely aware of how labels and their connotations can
define the entirety of who we are by a tragic moment that only lasted for a
flash out of a lifetime and, as a result, imprison us more effectively than iron
bars or stone walls ever could. Our lives in prison were filled with
stereotypes, classifications, labels, and oversimplifications of individual
human beings created for convenience, expediency, and even political and
economic advantage: “criminals,” “superpredators,” and “convicted felons.”
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These words denied who we were as human beings and left no space for
alternative narratives.
We realized that the commoditization, dehumanization, and even
warehousing of human beings were characteristics of a world where
individual stories were hidden under blanket indictments. However, we came
to understand that human behavior is more complex than society’s damning
labels would have us believe. From this new awareness came a drive to
undertake the arduous task of redefining ourselves and our struggle. Each of
us had his own story to tell. However, we needed a story in which we were
the “heroes,” not the “villains.” This narrative shift helped us to realize our
full potential and escape judgment on the basis of a partial or imagined
narrative.
As a result, we stopped referring to ourselves as “convicts,” “lifers,”
“prisoners,” “inmates,” or any other self-deprecating label that imprisons us
within the worst expression of ourselves. We stopped describing our
condemnation as life without parole. We concluded that there is a beauty
represented in the word “life” that our damnation would corrupt. So instead,
we chose a term that more accurately represented our wretched situation:
death by incarceration. After that very difficult first step of redefinition, our
journey towards redemption began.
In order to redeem yourself, you must first acknowledge that you have
done something wrong. This seemingly simple idea turned out not to be so
simple at all. Through our dialogue of discovery, we would find that we were
tainted by an adversarial system of “justice” that made accepting
responsibility and trying to make amends feel like a liability.
Like all things American, the criminal legal system is highly
competitive. It is an “us versus them” system in which you either win or lose.
The flaw in this way of operating is that winning becomes the sole objective,
leaving “justice” broken, bloody, and bruised by the wayside. No person or
thing is immune from this cultural influence. As a group, we had to come to
grips with how we were also affected by this highly flawed system of
“justice.”
Through our ongoing conversations, we discovered that, at the moment
of arrest, we became players in a game of life or death in which the stakes
could not be higher. To win meant living, getting our lives back, while to
lose meant hopelessness and death, because to live a life without hope is to
live a life with the kind of emptiness that can only be found in a grave. So
we denied. We imagined narratives that gave us the best chance of winning,
convinced that, when we entered those hallowed halls of justice, our lies
disguised as the truth would save us and carry us to victory. The process was
so highly competitive that there was no space for nuance, regret,
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reconciliation, or healing. It was either guilt or innocence, death or life. You
either lost or you won.
Nothing prepared us for when the lies didn’t work—when the judge
pronounced with finality that we were guilty, right before condemning us to
die in prison. Life as we knew it had come to an end. As we grappled with
the pain of what we had lost, it didn’t take us long to realize that the game
was rigged, stacked against us, and that we never had a chance at winning.
Our constitutionally protected right to a fair trial was compromised by racism
and poverty.
We realized that there existed within the process a pernicious, deliberate
indifference to fairness and equality that was so all-consuming that it made
it hard for us to see ourselves and the parts we played in these human
tragedies. What we had done became invisible, caught in a game of winning
and losing. Atonement was not a conscious thought at all.
Instead, we clung to our claims of innocence and focused on the
unfairness of the process. We could only see how our court-appointed
attorneys never visited us before our trials began, how they never performed
any investigations or interviewed any witnesses, how the assistant district
attorneys and police officers would withhold and fabricate evidence and
coerce false testimony and confessions.
Winning soon became our sole focus. It was our only means of holding
on to the fragile hope that we would one day have a second chance at life.
The harm that we caused became lost in the fight for our lives. Blinded by
this game of winning and losing, we leaned heavily on the walking sticks of
our denial of guilt, believing that it was the only path that did not end in the
loss of all hope, despair, and death by incarceration.
Yet with time, as we walked through this process together as a
Committee, we developed a greater understanding of the impact that this
flawed hypercompetitive system of “justice,” this us versus them dynamic,
had on us. We were able to come to grips with the realization that the
criminal legal system had embedded within us a selfishness—a sense of
entitlement—that only allowed us to see how we were wronged. We were so
consumed by these justified feelings of injustice that we were blinded to the
wrong we had done. Our dialogue allowed us to see—to realize—that we did
not live in a world populated only by ourselves and that our actions had
consequences reaching far beyond what had happened to us. Our
conversations allowed us to move beyond ourselves and see the pain that we
were responsible for. It opened up a space within us where we strived to
make right what we had done wrong and make amends to the communities
and, if possible, to the families that we had harmed. We realized that this
conscious decision—this need to make amends—was something uniquely
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human. But we also realized that to be condemned to die in prison stripped
us of the ability to exercise this distinctly human characteristic. We saw how
this condemnation not only blocked the path to redemption but also scorched
and razed it to the ground.
As a Committee, we reflected on the tremendous harm we had caused
to the communities we came from and concluded that we needed to atone—
to make amends—for the harm we caused. We also understood that righting
the wrongs of our past may be something forever out of our reach. But at the
same time, we realized that our communities were in desperate need of our
help, because within our communities were other young men and women
just like our former selves, whom we had the ability to reach. Atonement for
us meant trying to save as many of those at-risk lives as we possibly could.
Yet our condemnation separated us from those communities, both physically
and mentally, because inherent to a DBI sentence are the beliefs that we can
never be trusted, that we will never be better than our worst actions, and that
we must therefore be separated from our communities to keep them safe. But
having demonstrated that we are not the same and that we are willing to
atone, to redeem ourselves, how can we do so if we are forever locked into
the box of the worst expression of ourselves?
We decided that we wanted to be a group that reminded people of this
characteristic—this need to atone—that separated us from animals. We
wanted to remind people that every man, woman, and child has an absolute
right to redemption and that no other human being or system could take that
away. So we decided that this idea would shape us and keep us from
becoming lost in the means. We decided to call ourselves Right to
Redemption—a constant reminder of the pain for which we were
responsible, but also a reminder that every one of us belonging to this
sometimes-loving, sometimes-hateful, sometimes-estranged human family
has an inherent capacity to try to make amends for that pain.32 We decided
32

In a recent article, Professor Anna Roberts critiques the use of redemption in legal scholarship
because, in her view, it implies that those who have been convicted of a crime are sinful. Anna Roberts,
Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2538 (2020) (“And an argument for redemption or
rehabilitation seems to assume that one committed a crime and that, in doing so, one sinned or revealed
that one is sick and thus needs fixing.”). Our understanding of redemption could not be farther from this
characterization. In forming the R2R Committee, we chose the word redemption not because it was a
perfect term but because it was the best term in the English language to express our belief that we all
make mistakes and that we all have the capacity to learn from them. We intentionally characterized the
right to redemption as a human right because we believe that all human beings (not just those convicted
of a crime) have an innate capacity for change.
Professor Roberts further claims that by evoking redemption, legal scholars “risk obscuring flaws in
the conviction-production process and reinforcing harmful stereotypes about where guilt resides.” Id. at
2502. Similarly, Professor Michael Pinard claims that redemption “does not describe, reflect, or otherwise
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that what we called ourselves should be an embodiment of our struggle to
restore our natural right to be fully human—a right that was taken away when
we were condemned to die in prison.
B. Paths to Redemption
While our process was inherently and necessarily collective, we
discovered that the journey to redemption is fundamentally a personal one.
Redemption itself is not something that can be codified. It cannot be forced
upon an individual. It must come when someone realizes the pain he is
responsible for. Otherwise, how can someone right a wrong when there is no
acknowledgment of the wrong? How can one redeem oneself if there isn’t
an intent to do so? Redemption is a personal choice, and it arrives at different
times for different people.
*

*

*

Rell describes his relationship with redemption this way:
The idea of redemption has come to define me: it is something I
embody, it is what I think, what I breathe, and it has become the sustenance
that fuels me to struggle on as the smothering darkness of condemnation
snuffs out the light of hope. As the chairman of Right to Redemption, the
conversations of discovery and growth that I was a part of freed me from the
absolute confinement of a DBI prison sentence. It has liberated me in the
sense that I was able to demolish the invisible walls that I had unwittingly
helped to construct—walls that had imprisoned me within a game that I could
not win.
As the walls of self-pity held together by the mortar of my lies crumbled
around me, I was able to see how I had cocooned myself in this space of an
ironic reversal of perspectives where I became the “good guy.” Everything
that represented the state and the people who I had harmed became the “bad
guys” in this cosmic battle of good versus evil. What I had done, my
transgression, and the pain I had caused others became like a distant memory,
clinging to the edges of my consciousness as I fought to overcome the evil
machinations of the state.

relate to those who have been prosecuted because of their race, poverty, and criminalization. The
processes of atoning, repairing, and transforming have no application to them.” Michael Pinard, Race
Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 134 (2020). We
contend that it is possible to recognize, as we profoundly do, that the criminal legal system is often racist
and fundamentally flawed, while at the same time to wish that we were not shedders of anyone’s blood.
We must hold space for this complexity too.
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The idea of redemption saved me. It saved me from this narrowly
defined existence of us versus them, of vengeance masquerading as justice.
The right to redeem oneself has become as precious to me as the right to live
free, because the idea of redemption has awakened in me this incredible
sensitivity to a harm that, without my actions, could not exist in the world. It
has awakened in me this burning desire to right my wrongs and to give back
to the community that I so selfishly have taken so much from.
Without the idea of redemption being an intricate part of who I am, I
would still be locked within cages of self-pity and falsehoods. I would be
forever blocked from acknowledging the pain I caused, thereby allowing the
state to masquerade in a guise of justice so that it can then rationalize forever
denying me, and thousands just like me, the right to exercise that distinct
human capacity that we all share—the ability to atone.
*

*

*

For Ghani, it’s about seeing himself more fully and understanding his
greater purpose in the world:
For me, redemption became the reclaiming of all the dimensions of my
humanity, all the nuances that contributed to my commission of an
irreversible act, so that I can know for myself that I am more than what I was
in prison for. I have a purpose on this earth that is more than to take another
human life. I have a responsibility to not be confined to my lowest and
darkest moment. I have a journey to a destiny beyond condemnation to DBI.
I have a profound duty to discharge to the universe. For, certainly, the cosmic
implications of the blood that will forever stain my hands is not lost on me.
I maintain that I left a tear in the fabric of life that will never be mended—a
hole in the cosmos that will never be filled. But I am not accountable to the
system that condemned me. I am accountable to the family I thrust into a
state of permanent loss, to my own family that I had dishonored, to the
community of which I had not been a better teenaged member, and to my
peers and the younger children for whom I had failed as an example.
Over the years spent in the dark recesses of tombs called prisons, and
in coffins called cells, I traveled along the walls of my consciousness in
search of the truth of myself. Torchlights were offered to me by wellmeaning oldheads, and light emanated from books that became windows in
the walls of my consciousness and helped me to find my way to several
conclusions. One conclusion was that nothing kills the soul more quickly and
absolutely than a secret about a murder—and, if the murder is known, the
denial of it. What if I had gone a month, or six months, or a year, with the
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secret of what I had done? What would I have had to tell myself, and how
would I have had to act, in order to make myself appear normal? What would
I have become the longer I wore that mask? I learned to appreciate having
gone for only a week before what I had done was discovered. And during
that week, I felt the strain of having to put on a façade for the people around
me. Had I spent longer maintaining that façade, what would I have become?
Whatever innocence I had was gone, never to return, no matter how
much and how badly I wished it would. It drowned in the blood of my worst
wrongdoing. But I could and must regain my humanity and moral rectitude.
That’s what I told myself. No other struggle was more worthwhile. I could
and must water the seeds that I knew were still in the soil of my soul. And
those seeds could sprout and blossom into something, someone, worthy of
being called a community member, citizen, brother, friend, neighbor,
advocate, husband, and now father.
*

*

*

As we have set out above, the path to redemption is a deeply personal
one. Redemption is not something that the state can give or take away.
Rather, it can only facilitate or obstruct it. As with other human rights, the
right to redemption rests with the individual, not the state. The right does not
cease to exist because the state refuses to recognize it. At the same time, the
state can play an important role in helping people to exercise this right by
creating the space, opportunity, and encouragement for them to arrive at
redemption on their own. Indeed, as we describe in Part II, under human
rights law, the state has a duty to do so.
C. The U.S. Criminal Legal System’s Iron Bed
In our experience, the U.S. criminal legal system has not fulfilled its
obligation to facilitate the redemption of those within its custody. Rather, it
was an impediment on our road to redemption. Instead of cultivating
transformation or encouraging us to make amends, the carceral state locked
us in the worst expression of ourselves. No avenue was built into the criminal
legal process for recompense, reconciliation, healing, and hope, which
families and communities enclosed by all forms of violence so desperately
need. Below, Ghani fittingly describes the U.S. criminal process as
Procrustean.
*

*

*
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Procrustes was the bandit in the Greek tale of the hero Theseus. 33
Procrustes would invite travelers to spend the night in his inn, but once they
checked in, he would force them to lie down on his iron bed, binding them
with chains. For those who were shorter than the length of the bed, Procrustes
would stretch them on a rack until they equaled the length of the bed. For
those who were too tall, Procrustes would cut off their extremities to make
them fit the bed. In either case, the end result was death. In the same way,
the U.S. criminal legal system ruthlessly forces everyone into the same mold
of “criminal,” “superpredator,” “prisoner,” and “inmate.” It treats all of us
the same without regard for our special circumstances and individual
characteristics, effectively chaining millions to an iron bed and robbing them
of the chance of redemption. That iron bed is manifest in our mandatory
sentencing schemes, particularly mandatory life without parole.
This perspective is lifted higher by Danielle Sered, founder and director
of Common Justice and author of the groundbreaking book Until We Reckon:
Violence, Mass Incarceration, and a Road to Repair.34 According to Sered,
“In our zero-sum system, complexity is a liability.” 35 Complexity is
inefficient; it slows down the carceral machinery; it takes resources. The
system tries to remove the aspects of human beings that make us more than
empty vessels and refuses to acknowledge our capacity to change and grow
into responsible and contributing members of the human family. For the sake
of efficiency, it develops a story of “criminals” and “violent offenders” that
prevents us from being seen in the world as what all human beings are—
uniquely flawed but also capable of flourishing, loving, and healing.
For me, Miller v. Alabama, supported by Montgomery v. Louisiana,
became a crack and fissure in the foundations of the Procrustean bed and
forced the state to see me as I really am.36 In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled it unconstitutional to subject adolescents to mandatory LWOP
sentences.37 The Court mandated that a wider latitude of mitigating factors
must be considered by sentencing judges who might otherwise condemn a
33 For more information about the tale of Procrustes, see The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Procrustes: Greek Mythological Figure, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Procrustes
[https://perma.cc/9HPB-G4WX].
34 DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO
REPAIR 22 (2019).
35 Id.
36 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34
(2016). In many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, LWOP sentences are mandatory, which means
that the sentences are automatic for certain crimes without ever taking into account the individual
circumstances of the defendants. William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for
Replacing Life-Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1058,
1064 (2015).
37 567 U.S. at 465.
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teenager to die in prison,38 thereby introducing complexity into the system.
According to the Court, this decision reflected “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”39 The Court reserved
LWOP for those rare cases when juvenile defendants’ crimes reflect
“permanent incorrigibility.”40
In the resentencing of condemned children, it became the job of the
defense to lift up the complexity of the defendant and her narrative.
Mitigation experts were called forward to join defense teams.41 Mitigating
narratives thus came to the fore in the criminal legal process where they had
previously been left untold. Mitigation reports became an indispensable part
of the resentencing hearings of people who were sentenced to LWOP for
crimes committed when they were juveniles.42 These experts came to help
liberate condemned children from the Procrustean bed by telling the story of
the individual that was never told or even considered. We reclaimed the
complexity, the nuance. We told the stories of the hero’s journey. We told
our stories.
D. Redeeming the U.S. Criminal Legal System
In considering how the right to redeem oneself might be incorporated
into our country’s laws, we have to examine the underlying assumptions of
the system more broadly and deeply. We must be willing to take a hard look
at long-held, seldom-questioned beliefs to examine what they really mean
and if those meanings reflect our moral compositions.
The law is the codification of rules agreed upon by the community,
which are used to maintain order in society. It also entails the consequences
for those who break those agreed-upon rules. The foundation upon which the
law rests is the concept of justice. A law that exists without justice is simply
tyranny.
38

Id. at 489.
Id. at 469 (citation omitted).
40 Id. at 479–80; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. But cf. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307,
1321–22 (2021) (concluding that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before sentencing
a juvenile to LWOP).
41 Prior to Miller, any testimony by experts about the mitigating circumstances of a juvenile’s youth
at trial would be immaterial in jurisdictions where LWOP sentences were mandatory. See Miller, 567 U.S.
at 465, 473 (explaining that mitigating evidence at sentencing was irrelevant because judges did not have
discretion to alter sentences in light of mitigating evidence in jurisdictions where LWOP prison sentences
were mandatory, and consequently holding that judicial discretion to transfer a juvenile to an adult court
was not enough protection to satisfy the Eighth Amendment).
42 For example, Ghani’s mitigation report was crucial at his resentencing hearing. See Annie Ruhnke,
Lauren Fine & Joanna Visser Adjoian, Youth Sent’g & Reentry Project, Kempis Songster Mitigation
Report and Reentry Plan (July 7, 2017), http://northwesternlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/
Kempis-Songster-Mitigation-Report-and-Reentry-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MQ4-9GSK].
39
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What is justice, this idea that we use to ground the laws that govern us?
What is our motivation for punishing another for a wrong or injury? Looking
at the laws and structures that exist in our country, a theme emerges: Justice
is often conflated with vengeance.43 For some, vengeance satisfies feelings
of helplessness. It mitigates feelings of victimization. To exact vengeance is
to “empower.” That is the justification for the victim becoming the
victimizer. But in this world of hurting those who hurt you, there is an everexpanding pool of victims drowning in waters of pain. As a society of people
who pride themselves on using laws founded on principles of justice, it is
important that we closely examine how we define what justice is and not
confuse moral rightness and equity with vengeance. This is paramount
because laws are simply words printed on paper, making them only as good
as the people who are charged with enforcing them. If the people who
enforce the law believe that justice and vengeance are synonymous, then the
outcomes to which we hold them accountable will reflect that.
What does the law look like when it is soaked in vengeance? It is the
whispered echo of the Old Testament’s eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth that
takes on the form of statutes bereft of forgiveness and second chances. It is
the statute that issues punishments that smother hope and deny any chance
at redemption.44 It is the code that mandates DBI, condemning human beings
to die behind towering concrete and razor wire without a second thought.
These laws keep people locked away forever with the worst expression of
themselves and do not account for the possibility of transformation with
time.
As a society we have become mired in this historical, Old Testament
conception of punishment. But how does this millennia-old paradigm
reconcile with the twenty-first-century words of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Graham v. Florida, which state that “[t]o determine whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society”?45 If punishment is rooted in the ancient soils of an eye for an eye,
maintaining its conceptual integrity throughout the centuries, what does that
say about the progression of our society?

43
Jack Boeglin & Zachary Shapiro, A Theory of Differential Punishment, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1499,
1528 (2017) (“And, as a number of commentators have suggested, the increasingly influential ‘victims’
rights’ movement has been motivated in large part by some victims’ desire to utilize the criminal justice
system for just such vengeful motives.”).
44 Id. (explaining that states that adopt vengeance-based justifications for criminal punishment
prioritize victims’ desire for revenge over other reasons for lessening the imposition of punishment on
offenders).
45 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).
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Can law viewed through this prism of vengeance be mature and evolve?
How can it reflect redemption? We will answer that question by asking
another: If we satisfy our pain by causing pain to others, thereby creating
laws inundated with cycles of trauma and providing no opportunity to heal,
would those laws reflect anything redemptive? Would those laws be just?
Graham also stressed “the essential principle that, under the Eighth
Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who
have committed serious crimes.”46 Mandatory DBI flies directly in the face
of this principle because it ignores one of the most distinguishing
characteristics about human beings—the capacity to atone.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO REDEMPTION
At the same time the R2R Committee was developing its conception of
the right to redemption, other legal systems around the world were
simultaneously developing juridical concepts strikingly similar to ours. As
the Committee did, these jurisdictions linked hope to human dignity,
concluding that all human beings have a fundamental right to hope and that
the existence of this right forestalls DBI.
This Part, written with insights from Rachel López, a human rights
scholar, documents how the R2R Committee’s understandings of redemption
and its attendant rights align with international human rights law. The
significance of classifying the right to redemption as a human right means
that the right belongs to the individual, not the state. The state does not have
the power to give or take away this right. While there may be instances in
which the state denies the right, the right itself rests with the individual as
part of her essence of being human. It is inalienable.
A. The Legal Right to Redemption
1. The ECtHR’s Right to Redemption
At the same time that the R2R Committee was delineating its own
understanding of the right to redemption, the ECtHR was grappling with
whether there was a similar right embedded in human rights law.
Specifically, that court decided a series of cases that examined whether
“hope” is a vital aspect of the human experience, specifically in the context
of DBI sentences.47 Like the R2R Committee, the ECtHR understood the
46

Id. at 59.
Adriano Martufi, The Paths of Offender Rehabilitation and the European Dimension of
Punishment: New Challenges for an Old Ideal?, 25(6) MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 672, 676–77
(2018); see, e.g., Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 358 (Power-Forde, J.,
concurring) (“The judgment recognises, implicitly, that hope is an important and constitutive aspect of
the human person.”).
47
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concept of “hope” as being intertwined with belief in the capacity for
change.48 At their core, the decisions of the ECtHR affirm our central thesis:
all human beings have the capacity for change.
The ECtHR operationalized this belief in its landmark case, Vinter v.
United Kingdom, which concluded that “all prisoners, including those
serving life sentences, [must] be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and
the prospect of release if that rehabilitation is achieved.” 49 Absent the
possibility of release on the basis of rehabilitation, the court concluded, life
sentences run afoul of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment, much like the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.50
The court went so far as to characterize as “capricious” sentencing schemes
that result in people, like the men of the R2R Committee, not “knowing
whether, at an unspecified future date, a mechanism might be introduced
which would allow [them], on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be
considered for release.”51
Vinter expressly linked such torturous punishment to the impossibility
of atonement, saying “if [an individual] is incarcerated without any prospect
of release and without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed,
there is the risk that he can never atone for his offence.” 52 This holding
echoes the experiences of the men of the R2R Committee recounted in
Section I.A, who felt that “if nothing changed in the near future regarding
our condition [namely, our DBI sentences], then we would all have to face
the bleak reality of dying alone in prison, without ever having the
opportunity to try to make up for the harm that we caused.”
Like the Committee, the Vinter court grounded its decision in respect
for and protection of human dignity, a concept described as being at the “very
essence” of the ECHR53 (and which, as we will discuss more in Part IV, also
underlies the Eighth Amendment). The court affirmed what we already
know: human beings do not lose their capacity for change, no matter what
48

Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 358.
Id. at 347 (majority opinion). Alternatively, the court also noted that a whole life sentence is “a
poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment” because of its variable duration. Id. at 346–47.
Essentially, the longer a person lives, the more severe his sentence is. Id. at 346.
50 Id. at 346, 349–50 (“Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the
sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life
prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the
sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological
grounds.”).
51 Id. at 350.
52 Id. at 346.
53 Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 347; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
49
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crimes they have committed. As we explained in Section I.A, the “need to
make amends [is] something uniquely human.”54 It is deeply connected to
human dignity.55
Thus, in order to account for change over time, the court concluded that
punishment should reflect what criminologists call the “progression
principle,” which means that as an individual progresses through the criminal
legal system, the objective of his sentence should change over time. 56
Initially, a sentence might be grounded in retribution, and therefore be more
restrictive, but at later stages, the emphasis should be on preparation for
release.57 In other words, at the core of the progression principle is the belief
that individuals, even those in carceral settings, can change over time. In this
way, the court, like the R2R Committee, had a very individualized
conception of rehabilitation, understanding it to be a personal process and
movement towards change.58
Going another step further, Vinter effectively held that the
administration of sentences must reflect this progression of the human person
over time.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that in order to
detain someone, there must be a legitimate penological justification, such as
retribution, deterrence, public protection, or rehabilitation.60 In line with the
progression principle, the grounds for detention are not static; rather, they
shift over time. 61 What might have constituted a legitimate ground for
detention early on may become unjust over time, particularly the longer
detention goes on.62 Without regular review of the state’s justification for
someone’s continued detention, these shifts cannot be fully appreciated.63
For that reason, authorities must periodically review a sentence to assess
“whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such
progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence,
as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate
penological grounds.”64 The essence of the Vinter decision is the following:
in light of the evolving reasons for punishment, all sentences must be both
54

See supra Section I.A.
See Amanda Ploch, Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to Rehabilitation from
International and National Perspectives, 44 J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 900–02 (2012).
56 Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 112–13, 116.
57 Id. at 113.
58 See Martufi, supra note 47, at 681.
59
Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349.
60 Id. at 346.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 346, 349.
63 Id. at 346.
64 Id. at 349.
55
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reviewable and reducible, both de jure and de facto.65 Sentences should not
be one-size-fits-all Procrustean beds, as unalterable DBI sentences in the
United States are.
The ECtHR’s conceptualization of rehabilitation reflects how the R2R
Committee described the path to redemption. Just as the R2R Committee did,
the ECtHR linked rehabilitation to personal responsibility.66 Specifically, the
court envisioned rehabilitation occurring from “re-socialisation through the
fostering of personal responsibility” over the course of a prison sentence.67
Or, as we described in Section I.B, redemption “must come when someone
realizes the pain he is responsible for.” Since rehabilitation, according to the
court, is considered personal and individual, the ECtHR does not guarantee
a right to rehabilitation per se.68 Rather, states have a positive obligation to
promote rehabilitation, meaning that they must provide those who have
received life sentences with “a real opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.”69
States must facilitate redemption, not obstruct it.
The ECtHR has characterized this duty to promote rehabilitation as “an
obligation of means, not one of result.”70 In practice, this characterization
requires states to empower individuals “to the extent possible within the
constraints of the prison context, to make such progress towards
rehabilitation that it offers him or her the hope of one day being eligible for
parole or conditional release.”71 Although not required, the court stated that
one way to accomplish this would be by setting up and regularly reviewing
an individualized program that would encourage the individual “to lead a
responsible and crime-free life.”72 In perhaps its strongest articulation of the
state’s duties, the ECtHR concluded that the “emphasis on rehabilitation and
reintegration has become a mandatory factor that the member States need to
take into account in designing their penal policies.”73
The ECtHR jurisprudence also reinforces the R2R Committee’s
conceptual analysis of redemption as a right in that the court framed these
requirements as bestowing certain rights on those in custody (along with
corresponding obligations on the state). Specifically, the court held that the
right to a review entails “an actual assessment” of information relevant to
65

Id. at 346.
Martufi, supra note 47, at 680–88.
67 Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 112.
68 Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 445.
69 Id.
70 Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 104 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD].
71 Id. ¶ 103.
72 Id.
73 Khoroshenko v. Russia, 2015-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 329, 373.
66
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preestablished criteria, meaning that review must be meaningful and in
accordance with established law. 74 Moreover, the ECtHR held that
individuals sentenced to life imprisonment have a right to know “at the outset
of [their] sentence, what [they] must do to be considered for release and . . .
when a review of [their] sentence will take place or may be sought.”75 The
power to exercise this right is born at the moment of sentencing. 76
Consequently, when the state provides no path to release, the individual has
the right to contest her sentence at that moment, rather than wait until a later
stage of her incarceration.77 In contrast, the incarcerated members of the R2R
Committee still have no idea what they must do in order to be considered for
release, nor when, if ever, a review of their sentence will take place. They
have no pathway to exercise their right to redemption.
2. The Council of Europe
The Vinter court relied heavily on the standards set by the Council of
Europe, the body that created the ECtHR to enforce the human rights
obligations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights.78 The
Council of Europe first denounced DBI over forty years ago, when it
commissioned a study that concluded that “it is inhuman to imprison a person
for life without the hope of release.”79 The following year, the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe went further still, passing a resolution
urging member states to ensure “long-term sentences are imposed only if
they are necessary for the protection of society.”80 In simplest terms, lengthy
sentences should no longer be justifiable by retribution alone.
74

Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100.
Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 350.
76 Id. (“Consequently, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review
of a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment
of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.”).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 347–48 (“Council of Europe instruments . . . also demonstrate, firstly, that commitment
to rehabilitation is equally applicable to life sentence prisoners; and secondly, that, in the event of their
rehabilitation, life sentenced prisoners should also enjoy the prospect of conditional release.”). For an
explanation of the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights,
see A Convention to Protect Your Rights and Liberties, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/
human-rights-convention#:~:text=The%20European%20Court%20of%20Human,in%20the%20member
%20state%20concerned [https://perma.cc/K99T-DGTP].
79 SANDRA FREDMAN, COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 173 (2018) (quoting SUB-COMM. NO.
XXV OF EUR. COMM. ON CRIME PROBS., THE GENERAL REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF LONG-TERM
PRISONERS 77 (1975)).
80 Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Resolution (76) 2 On the Treatment of Long-Term Prisoners
1 (Feb. 17, 1976), https://rm.coe.int/16804f2385 [https://perma.cc/P64W-2YJY]. The Committee of
Ministers “is the Council’s decision-making body and is made up of the ministers of foreign affairs of
each member state or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. The Committee of
75
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To root out sentences solely based on retribution as soon as practicably
possible, the resolution also encouraged states to examine sentences “as early
as possible to determine whether or not a conditional release can be granted,”
recommending that they be reviewed after eight to fourteen years of
detention and regularly reviewed thereafter. 81 In addition, in
Recommendation 2003(22) on conditional release, the Committee of
Ministers affirmed the need for conditional release to be available for all
sentences, including life sentences.82 It viewed this guarantee as a way to
reduce the harmful effects of imprisonment.83 The Committee of Ministers
further recommended that all individuals should know at the start of their
sentences either the minimum term after which they will become eligible for
release and the criteria they would need to satisfy to be granted release, or
the fixed term of their sentences after which they are entitled to release.84
In addition to these recommendations, the Committee of Ministers has
adopted multiple affirmations of its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal
of punishment, going beyond the review of sentences and outlining what
prisons that embrace the rehabilitative ideal should aspire to do. Specifically,
in 2003, ten years prior to Vinter, it passed two recommendations that laid
out a blueprint for prisons that hardly resemble the places where we resided
for decades in the United States. First, Recommendation 2003(23) on the
management of life and other long-term sentences advised that officials
should strive to, among other things, “counteract the damaging effects of life
and long-term imprisonment” and “increase and improve the possibilities for
[those serving these sentences] to be successfully resettled in society and to
lead . . . law-abiding li[ves] following their release.”85

Ministers decides Council of Europe policy and approves its budget and programme of activities.” For
more information, see The Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/
about-us/structure [https://perma.cc/G6KJ-TGKF].
81 Council of Eur., supra note 80, at 2.
82 Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)22 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on Conditional Release (Parole) (Sept. 24, 2003), https://rm.coe.int/
16800ccb5d [https://perma.cc/3PV6-LK5Z]. The Committee’s Recommendation defined conditional
release as the early release under individualized post-release conditions and requiring more than the
possibility of an amnesty or pardon. Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)23 of the Committee of
Ministers on the Management by Prison Administrations of Life Sentence and Other Long-Term
Prisoners, (Oct. 9, 2003), https://www.ochrance.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ochrana_osob/Umluvy/
vezenstvi/R_2003_23_management_of_life_sentence_and_long-term_prisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9JBG-55WS].
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Second, in carrying out these aims, the Committee of Ministers
recommended that states abide by a set of principles, which further reinforce
the teachings of the R2R Committee, including the following:
•

•
•
•

The individualization principle: “Consideration should be
given to the diversity of personal characteristics to be found
among life sentence and long-term prisoners and account taken
of them to make individual plans for the implementation of the
sentence . . . .”
The normalization principle: “Prison life should be arranged so
as to approximate as closely as possible to the realities of life
in the community . . . .”
The responsibility principle: “Prisoners should be given
opportunities to exercise personal responsibility in daily prison
life . . . .”
The progression principle: “Individual planning for the
management of the prisoner’s life or long-term sentence should
aim at securing progressive movement through the prison
system . . . .”86

Notably, the ECtHR echoed the above objectives and two of these principles,
the individualization and progression principles, when coming to its decision
in Vinter.87
In line with the insights of the R2R Committee, adopting these
principles would infuse the U.S. criminal legal system with complexity and
hold space for individual circumstances. In the words of the R2R Committee,
prison would not be a Procrustean bed that treats everyone the same. Instead,
the plans for each person’s sentence would be individualized to best facilitate
that person’s path to personal redemption. Yet, these aspirations could not
be further from the experiences of the R2R members in U.S. custody. Still,
they are instructive because they provide a roadmap for how the right to
redemption could be incorporated more broadly into U.S. correctional
institutions, should we more sincerely adhere to the rehabilitative ideal.
B. The U.S. Commitment to the Rehabilitative Ideal
The United States has already committed to the rehabilitative ideal of
criminal punishment, as a general principle, through the international human
rights instruments that it has signed and ratified. Specifically, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is
86

Id. app. at 3–5, 8.
Vinter v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10, and 3896/10, ¶ 61 (July 9, 2013),
https://echr.coe.int/documents/reports_recueil_2013-iii.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DDS-HA6Z]. The excerpt
published in print did not contain this paragraph, so we have cited the complete online version.
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binding on the United States, guarantees respect for detained individuals and
ensures their humane, restorative treatment as follows.88 First, Article 10(1)
provides that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”89
Second, Article 10(3) provides that “[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation
and social rehabilitation.”90 General Comment No. 21 on Article 10 by the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the treaty body that monitors the
implementation of the ICCPR, further clarified that “[n]o penitentiary
system should be only retributory; it should essentially seek the reformation
and social rehabilitation of the prisoner.”91
In addition to this guidance on Article 10, in General Comment No. 35
on Article 9 of ICCPR, which protects the right to liberty and security of
person, the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted that “[c]onsideration for
parole [and] other forms of early release must be in accordance with the
law.” 92 This meant, the Human Rights Committee specified, that release
cannot be denied on arbitrary grounds, and that granting early release should
be predicated on the individual’s rehabilitation and whether the individual
poses any threat to public safety.93
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also dealt with individual
complaints regarding the legality of life sentences. For example, in
Blessington v. Australia, the committee found that sentencing two
adolescents to life imprisonment violated the ICCPR.94 Although this case
was related to juvenile life sentences, the committee made several
observations about life sentences more broadly. Like the ECtHR in Vinter,
the committee specified that human rights law requires that there must be
more than just a theoretical possibility of review and release for those serving

88 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]. Despite these binding obligations, there are numerous obstacles to their
enforcement. See generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999); Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995).
89 ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 10(1).
90 Id. art. 10(3).
91 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ICCPR, General Comment No. 21 on art. 10, ¶ 10 (Apr. 10, 1992).
For more information about the purpose and function of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see
Introduction of the Committee, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx
[https://perma.cc/M8S5-4UTU].
92 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ICCPR, General Comment No. 35 on art. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35,
¶ 20 (Dec. 16, 2014).
93 Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
94 Communication No. 1968/2010, United Nations Human Rights Committee [U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm.], ¶¶ 7.12, 8 (Nov. 3, 2014).
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life sentences. 95 Rather, the review procedure must allow for a thorough
evaluation of the detained person’s progress towards rehabilitation and the
state’s justification of his continued detention.96 Echoing Article 10(3) of
ICCPR, the committee affirmed that no penitentiary system should be strictly
retributory, and that it should essentially seek the prisoner’s reformation and
social rehabilitation.97
III. DBI IS A VIOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO REDEMPTION
Out of line with its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal under
international human rights law, the United States has taken a decidedly
retributivist approach to criminal punishment. The U.S. criminal legal
system regularly makes everlasting judgments that leave little to no room for
reconsideration. Once someone is deemed irredeemable, the legal machinery
is set in motion, and it is nearly impossible to change its course. This Part
explains what drives that machinery, state by state. Using the jurisprudence
outlining the human right to redemption described above as its frame, this
Part demonstrates how, in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States,
a life sentence truly does mean death by incarceration, no matter how
someone evolves over time.
A. DBI Under the Eighth Amendment
The U.S. Supreme Court’s own descriptions of LWOP illustrate why
the United States’ conception of LWOP is out of line with human rights
principles, particularly the rehabilitative ideal described in Part II. 98 The
perpetual condemnation and hopelessness of DBI sentences, which we
describe in Part I, is not happenstance; it is sanctified in legal doctrine.99
As a matter of law, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, LWOP
sentences eschew the rehabilitative ideal protected and promoted by human
rights law. By the Supreme Court’s own admission, LWOP denies hope

95

Id. ¶ 7.7.
Id. ¶ 7.8.
97 Id.
98 For a comprehensive review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to LWOP, see
Nadia Bernaz, Life Imprisonment and the Prohibition of Inhuman Punishments in International Human
Rights Law: Moving the Agenda Forward, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 470, 470–80 (2013).
99 Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 76 (“Hope,
or its denial, distinguishes LWOP from other prison sentences—not irrevocability, and not any necessary
difference in the actual length of incarceration.”). Furthermore, at the federal level, the U.S. Congress has
expressly acknowledged that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582; see also Lichtenberg, supra note 13, at 48 n.42.
96
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eternally.100 In Graham, the Court characterized LWOP as “depriv[ing] the
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,” and
held such sentences were cruel and unusual for juveniles who committed
nonhomicide offenses.101 Such infinite deprivation is permissible for others,
because, in the Court’s mind, these sentences reflect “an irrevocable
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society.”102 In essence, a
decision about a person’s worth has been stamped and sealed by the state
without any further need for reconsideration.
By design, LWOP sentences are not meant to facilitate rehabilitation.
The U.S. Supreme Court said as much, concluding in Graham and reiterating
in Miller that an LWOP sentence “forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal.”103 With rehabilitation off the table, the state’s responsibility to these
individuals is limited to feeding, housing, and providing limited healthcare
to them, devoid of the individualization and regular assessments necessitated
by human rights law.104
Following that line of reasoning, the Court in Miller concluded that the
Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” because of the difficulty
of distinguishing between “transient immaturity” and “irreparable
corruption” in people of that age.105 In Jones v. Mississippi, a case decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court last Term, the Court was asked to decide whether
this language is tantamount to a permanent-incorrigibility rule, as some
states have adopted in the wake of Miller. Namely, the issue considered by
the Court was “[w]hether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing
authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before
imposing a sentence of life without parole.”106 Although the Court ultimately
concluded that such a finding was too difficult for courts to make and thus
not required by the U.S. Constitution, it did not preclude states from adopting
their own more rigorous requirements, including their own permanent-

100 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010) (“Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives
no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”); see
also Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989) (noting that an LWOP sentence “means denial of
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of
his days”).
101
560 U.S. at 69–70; see also Ristroph, supra note 99, at 76–77.
102 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
103 Id.; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
104 Berry, supra note 36, at 1057.
105 567 U.S. at 479–80.
106 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at i.
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incorrigibility rules.107 But should a state decide to require a sentencer to find
someone permanently incorrigible before imposing a DBI sentence, such a
ruling, like DBI, would be fundamentally at odds with the rehabilitative ideal
enshrined in the ICCPR, to which the United States is bound, and contrary
to the right to redemption, which is grounded on the principle that no human
being is irredeemable. Rather, we believe that all sentences should take into
account the human capacity for change and be amendable based on personal
redemption.
Because LWOP fails to account for human evolution over time, we
believe that it is tantamount to DBI. The Court’s characterization of LWOP
affirms our understanding that it is akin to a death sentence. While the Court
had previously put the death penalty in a category of its own, proclaiming
that “death is different”108 from other types of punishment, more recently, it
has drawn parallels between LWOP and death sentences, pointing out that
LWOP sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences that are
shared by no other sentences.” 109 Specifically, under the law, LWOP
sentences—like death sentences—represent an irrevocable determination
that the condemned lack any ability to redeem themselves.110 In the plurality
opinion in Graham, Justice Anthony Kennedy was not persuaded that the
possibility of executive clemency mitigated “the harshness of the sentence,”
because the possibility was so remote.111
B. DBI in the United States
Furthermore, unlike much of the rest of world (as we will detail further
in Part IV), the United States has made a decisive turn towards life sentences,
with the number of people serving life sentences more than quadrupling
since 1984.112 As of 2016, there were nearly 162,000 people serving a life
sentence—amounting to one in every nine people in prison.113 Almost a third
(over 50,000) are serving LWOP sentences, leaving no possibility of
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Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1315, 1318 (2021).
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
109 Graham v. Miller, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010).
110 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75.
111 560 U.S. at 70.
112 NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENT’G PROJECT, DELAYING A SECOND CHANCE: THE DECLINING
PROSPECTS FOR PAROLE ON LIFE SENTENCES 3 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
delaying-second-chance-declining-prospects-parole-life-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/MPM6-PQCX].
113 ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONGTERM SENTENCES 5 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/still-life-americasincreasing-use-life-long-term-sentences/#III.%20Life%20by%20the%20Numbers%20 [https://perma.
cc/4LBG-NHKJ].
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release.114 This statistic represents a sharp increase from the past—in 1992,
there were only 12,000 people serving LWOP sentences in the United
States.115
The dramatic rise of life sentences can be attributed to three factors:
(1) the abolition of parole and embrace of truth-in-sentencing and threestrikes laws; (2) the increase in mandatory sentences, particularly under
“habitual offender” laws; and (3) the use of LWOP as the alternative to the
death penalty.116 The turn to life imprisonment also follows a broader shift in
the United States from a focus on rehabilitation to one bent on retribution
and incapacitation during the crime waves of the 1970s and 1980s.117
The vast majority of people serving LWOP sentences are concentrated
in a few states; Florida (16.7%), Pennsylvania (10.1%), California (9.6%),
Louisiana (9.1%), and the federal system (7.2%) account for just over half
(52.7%) of the nationwide LWOP population.118 “In Delaware, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania more than 10 percent of the state prison
population is serving a life sentence with no chance for parole.”119 In ten
states—Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin—all life sentences exclude the
possibility of parole.120 In all but one state—Alaska121—LWOP is a possible
sentence, making DBI a possibility in nearly all fifty states in the United
States. Unlike the death penalty, which has high reversal rates, reversal of
LWOP sentences are rare, if not impossible, occurrences.122 Consequently,
in most jurisdictions in the United States, executive clemency is often the
only path to escaping DBI for those serving LWOP sentences.123
114

Id. at 9.
Berry, supra note 36, at 1059.
116 Id. at 1059, 1064.
117 Id. at 1059.
118 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 9.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 34 n.12. In Arizona, the legislature technically abolished parole in 1993; however, Arizona
courts still regularly sentenced people to life with a chance of parole. In 2018, Arizona passed a law that
would provide for parole for those sentenced to life with parole through the clemency process. Michael
Kiefer, Governor Signs Bill Reinstating Chance of Parole in Some Murder Cases, AZCENTRAL.COM (May
1, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2018/05/01/
governor-signs-bill-reinstating-chance-parole-some-murder-cases/571147002/ [https://perma.cc/6UF7VRPN].
121 But see Daniel Nichanian, Reformers Target Life Imprisonment and Sentences of Life Without
Parole, APPEAL (Feb. 28, 2019), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/reformers-target-lifeimprisonment-and-sentences-of-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/A28Y-76N8] (noting that
Alaska’s ninety-nine-year sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP).
122 See Berry, supra note 36, at 1057 & n.35.
123 See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 15:1 (“After exhaustion of judicial remedies,
executive clemency remains the only avenue of sentence review.”).
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Clemency can take many forms, but commutations, and in some states
pardons, are the only avenues to permanent release for someone serving
LWOP.124 Pardons absolve convicted persons of guilt and relieve all or some
of the legal disabilities arising from the pardoned conviction, often restoring
rights, such as the right to vote, the ability to hold public office, and the right
to bear arms. 125 Pardons are typically considered an act of mercy or
forgiveness by the executive branch.126 In the many states, however, in order
to apply for a pardon, the applicant must have completed his sentence,
thereby rendering this form of clemency a nonstarter for those currently
incarcerated in those states.127 This leaves commutation, which results in the
reduction of a judicially imposed sentence, as the only possible avenue of
release for those serving LWOP in many states.128
C. DBI Infringes on the Human Right to Redemption
Yet, clemency in most (if not all) jurisdictions in the United States does
not satisfy the requirements laid out in the case law of the ECtHR, which is
considered persuasive authority by the U.S. Supreme Court and holds
particular significance in Eight Amendment cases.129 As described in Part II,
one of the most central aspects of the right to redemption is that there must
be a possibility of review and a path to release based on an individual’s
rehabilitation. As will be detailed in Section III.D, the clemency processes
in many U.S. states substantially lack tangible opportunities for review and
release.
While governments are afforded a “margin of appreciation” in
designing the mechanism for review, the ECtHR has specified that for the
124 See, e.g., Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513, 514 (Wyo. 1990) (highlighting that because good-time
credit does not apply to life incarceration in Wyoming, only the executive’s commutation power can
release an offender under such a sentence before her natural death). Clemency can take the form of a
pardon, commutation, remission, or reprieve. Remission involves the forgiveness of court-imposed fines
or fees. Reprieve is only a temporary suspension of sentence. See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15.1.
125 CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:2.
126 See, e.g., Mason v. State, 103 So. 2d 337, 341 (Ala. Ct. App. 1956) (“A pardon cannot wipe out
the historical fact of the conviction . . . it involves forgiveness, and not forgetfulness.”); R.J.L. v. State,
887 So. 2d 1268, 1281 (Fla. 2004) (“A pardon is the equivalent of forgiveness for a crime, it does not
declare the pardoned individual innocent of the crime.”); State v. Blanchard, 100 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2002) (“A pardon involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness and it does not wipe the slate
clean.” (quoting State v. Skinner, 632 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re
Sang Man Shin, 206 P.3d 91, 91 (Nev. 2009) (stating that “a pardon is an act of forgiveness”); Andrews
v. Gardiner, 121 N.E. 341, 343 (N.Y. 1918) (describing a pardon as an act of “grace and mercy”).
127 See 50-State Comparison: Pardon Policy & Practice, RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisoncharacteristics-of-pardonauthorities-2 [https://perma.cc/YK26-L4UU].
128 See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:1.
129 See infra Part IV.
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review to comport with human rights law, certain minimum standards must
be met.130 To start with, the review must allow for consideration of “any
changes in the life prisoner and progress towards his or her rehabilitation
[that] are of such significance that continued detention is no longer justified
on legitimate penological grounds.”131 As a general rule, this review “must
be based on rules having a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty” and
release based on “objective, pre-established criteria.”132 In Vinter, the ECtHR
also noted that international and comparative law support “the institution of
a dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than twenty-five years
after the imposition of a life sentence, with further periodic reviews
thereafter.”133 Simply put, review mechanisms must be regular, predictable,
and certain. 134 In addition, even when a review mechanism is in place, a
scheme must allow for the actual reduction of sentences; in other words,
when someone has no realistic opportunity for release, her punishment is
inhuman and degrading under Article 3 of the ECHR.135 Thus, in assessing
reducibility, the ECtHR has found that mechanisms resulting in no or only
very few releases are suspect. 136 In the words of the R2R Committee,
mechanisms that afford no possibility of actual release amount to death by
incarceration.
In Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR specifically addressed
under what circumstances executive clemency guaranteed enough process
and a sufficient possibility of release to comply with these human rights
standards. Examining the United Kingdom’s clemency process, the
Hutchinson court determined that review of life sentences by the executive
branch and release under “exceptional circumstances” is not a per se
violation of Article 3.137 In assessing why the United Kingdom’s clemency
process did not run afoul of Article 3, the court examined four factors: (1) the

130

Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349.
Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD].
132 Id.
133 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 350.
134 Id. at 350–51.
135 See id. at 346.
136 Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is reducible
de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the review
mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.” (citation
omitted)).
137 App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 49–50, 55 (Jan. 17, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347
[https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]. Professor William Berry III has previously argued that LWOP violates
the human rights standards concretized in Vinter. See Berry, supra note 36, at 1073. However, since
Hutchinson has concluded that release through executive review processes like clemency can provide
sufficient possibility of review and release, Professor Berry’s claim requires more scrutiny and nuance.
131
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nature of review, (2) the scope of review, (3) the criteria and conditions for
review, and (4) the time frame of review.138
First, in assessing the nature of review, the Hutchinson court concluded
that “the executive nature of a review is not in itself contrary to the
requirements of Article 3.”139 This conclusion was based on the margin of
appreciation allotted to states in designing their mechanisms for review.140
At the same time, the court in Hutchinson placed great importance on the
fact that all executive reviews were subject to judicial review and such
reviews had to be in compliance with Article 3 so that the executive branch’s
discretion was not unfettered.141
Second, with regard to the scope of review, the ECtHR in Hutchinson
reiterated that allowing release only on “compassionate grounds” for those
with terminal conditions would be insufficient.142 As the court underscored
in Vinter (which also examined the United Kingdom’s clemency scheme),
criminal law schemes must also permit actual reduction of a sentence in light
of rehabilitation.143 The ECtHR, however, noted that the subsequent case law
in the United Kingdom had clarified that the “exceptional circumstances”
warranting release under the U.K. scheme included “exceptional progress
towards rehabilitation,” so it was not out of line with Article 3 of the
ECHR.144
Third, when examining whether the criteria and conditions for review
are sufficient under Article 3, the ECtHR clarified that “[t]he relevant
question is whether those serving life sentences in the domestic system can
know what they must do to be considered for release, and under what
conditions the review takes place.”145 Although the court noted that variation
is permitted and a high degree of precision is not required to comply with
human rights law, a review scheme must have “a degree of specificity or
precision as to the criteria and conditions attaching to sentence review, in
keeping with the general requirement of legal certainty.”146 In its analysis,

138

Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 46–69.
Id. ¶ 50.
140 Id. ¶ 45.
141 Id. ¶¶ 46–53.
142 Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
143 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 349 (“Article 3 must be interpreted as
requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to
consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards
rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no
longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.”).
144 Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 55, 57.
145 Id. ¶ 58 (citation omitted).
146 Id. ¶ 59.
139
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the Hutchinson court recalled past cases in which the national scheme fell
short of this threshold, citing the following features: (1) absence of a legal
obligation for the executive to give reasons for its decisions;147 (2) “lack of
publicly-available policy statements”;148 (3) “the complete lack of formal and
informal safeguards”; 149 and (4) the “absence of a sentence review
mechanism operating on the basis of objective, pre-established criteria.”150
With regard to the U.K. system of review under scrutiny in Hutchinson,
the court specified that its determination that the criteria and conditions for
review met the Article 3 requirements hinged on two considerations. First,
the ECtHR was persuaded in light of recent case law that, going forward, the
U.K. scheme would be guided by the human rights standards laid out by the
ECtHR. 151 Second, since the executive branch was required to provide
justifications for its decisions and such decisions were reviewable by the
judiciary, the ECtHR believed that the criteria for release would be further
fleshed out in the future.152
In Hutchinson, the court also reiterated its holding in past decisions that
if individual reasons for grants or denials are not given, the state must ensure
transparency through other means.153 For example, the court recounted how,
in Harakchiev and Tolumov, Bulgaria had achieved this by establishing a
clemency commission, which had to consider international human rights
law, in addition to other practices that made its operations less opaque.154
These practices included “the publication of the criteria that guide [the
clemency commission] in the examination of clemency requests, the reasons
for its recommendations to the Vice-President to exercise the power of
clemency in individual cases, and relevant statistical information.” 155 In
addition, the executive order that established the clemency process could be
challenged in a court of law.156 The court considered these safeguards enough
to ensure “the consistent and transparent exercise of presidential powers.”157
In contrast, the ECtHR criticized the previous administration under
President Georgi Parvanov, which governed Bulgaria from 2002 to 2012, for
147
148
149
150

Id. (citing Magyar v. Hungary, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 460).
Id. (citing Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 444).
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trabelsi v. Belgium, 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 257,

334).
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
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Id. (citing Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 412–16).
Harakchiev, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391 at 443.
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being “quite opaque.” 158 This administration did not make any policy
statements about the clemency process available to the public or provide any
reasons whatsoever for individual clemency decisions.159 The ECtHR found
that this “complete lack of formal or even informal safeguards,” coupled with
the absence of cases resulting in actual release, meant that the petitioner’s
sentence was de facto irreducible, and therefore in violation of Article 3.160
Finally, with regard to the fourth factor considered, the time frame for
review of life sentences, the ECtHR stated that there is no fixed time frame
for review but reiterated Vinter’s finding that human rights law and
comparative law support a review “no later than twenty-five years after the
imposition of a life sentence, with further periodic reviews thereafter.”161
The ECtHR has already found that the U.S. federal review scheme does
not comply with the standards of Article 3 articulated in its jurisprudence. In
Trabelsi v. Belgium, the court examined whether Belgium had violated the
prohibition on cruel and inhumane treatment when it extradited an individual
to the United States who could possibly be subjected to LWOP. 162 The
ECtHR recognized that under the U.S. scheme, release would be possible for
Nizar Trabelsi under certain circumstances. 163 Namely, his sentence could
theoretically be reduced (1) if he provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of someone else, (2) for compelling
humanitarian reasons, (3) through commutation of his sentence, or (4) via
presidential pardon.164 Noting that all these procedures were “very general
and vague,” however, the court concluded that none of these mechanisms
provided a “prospect of release” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Article 3.165 More precisely, the court held so because no review mechanism
existed under the U.S. federal scheme that required authorities to assess,
based on “objective, pre-established criteria,” whether someone had
“changed and progressed to such an extent that continued detention [could]
no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.” 166 While not
expressly articulated, reading these cases together, the court seems most
concerned with schemes that place too much discretion in the hands of the
executive branch and therefore could easily be subject to abuse.
158

Id. at 444.
Id. at 410–11, 444.
160 Id. at 444.
161 Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶¶ 68–69 (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U].
162 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 307.
163 Id. at 333.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 333–34.
166 Id.
159
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D. State-by-State Analysis of Clemency
In light of this jurisprudence and the fact that the majority of people
serving LWOP sentences in the United States serve them in state correctional
facilities, we conducted a state-by-state analysis of each state’s clemency
process to see which states fail to provide either a prospect of release or
possibility of review under human rights law.
As a starting point, however, we note that nearly every jurisdiction in
the United States is suspect under the human rights standards articulated by
the ECtHR. As explained in Section III.C, although review of sentences by
the executive branch is not a per se violation of Article 3, the executive’s
decisions cannot be unfettered.167 Indeed, one of the central reasons that the
ECtHR found that the United Kingdom’s clemency scheme was in
compliance with human rights standards was that all executive reviews were
subject to judicial review.168 This feature is not present in U.S. clemency
processes. Rather, at the state and federal levels, the executive branch has
near-unfettered discretion to grant or deny clemency, without any oversight
by the other branches.169 Unless clemency decisions run afoul of the U.S.
Constitution, they are generally not subject to judicial or legislative review.170
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “pardon and commutation decisions have
not traditionally been the business of courts.”171 In addition, access to the
pardon and commutation process is considered a privilege, not a right. 172
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that those serving life
sentences have no due process right to obtain the reasons that state pardon

167

Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 50 (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U]; see also supra note 137
(referencing Professor Berry’s argument that needs more nuanced consideration in light of Hutchinson).
168 Hutchinson, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 46–53.
169 See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998) (“[P]ardon and
commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever,
appropriate subjects for judicial review.” (citations omitted)); Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.
1986) (reflecting the traditional hands-off policy of the judiciary towards executive prerogatives of
clemency); Carroll v. Raney, 953 S.W.2d 657, 660–61 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the Governor has
constitutional authority to commute a sentence for sexual assault to “22 years to life” despite the relevant
statute’s precluding indeterminate sentencing); McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004, 1006–07 (Conn.
1988) (holding that because the pardon power vests in the legislature it could establish a court of pardons
from which there is no right to judicial review); see also Jing Cao, Commuting Life Without Parole
Sentences: The Need for Reason and Justice over Politics 60–62 (2015) (S.J.D. dissertation, Fordham
Law School), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=sjd [https://
perma.cc/KDD7-XS9W] (describing clemency as “a standardless process” that is likely to cause
confusion and undermine fairness in sentencing).
170 Cao, supra note 169, at 60.
171 Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
172 See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, § 15:1.
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boards denied their requests for commutation, 173 a factor frequently
considered by the ECtHR. Thus, in order to accord with the human rights
standards laid out above, states must provide sufficient safeguards and
ensure transparency through other means.174 As will be detailed below, these
additional safeguards are generally not present in U.S. clemency processes.
Adding further to these human rights concerns, clemency decisions in
the United States tend to be very political.175 The American Bar Association
(ABA) has described clemency decisions as “often perceived [by the
executive branch] (rightly or wrongly) as political ‘hot potatoes’ that can be
used against them if the public is not supportive.”176 The ABA also warned
that “politics and public opinion will almost always come into play as this
critical decision is made.”177 For that reason, the ABA advises applicants “to
remember that local politics, history, demographics, culture, and ethos are
always at play when a plea for clemency is being considered.”178 This added
layer of ambiguity raises concerns about whether clemency in general falls
short of the guarantees to a certain and predictable process detailed in ECtHR
jurisprudence.179
In addition to these general concerns about clemency in all jurisdictions
in the United States, we also examined the clemency processes in each of the
fifty states. To determine whether these jurisdictions provided a sufficient
“possibility of review,” we examined the following standards laid out in
173

Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466–67.
See Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 61 (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U].
175 See Rachel Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G.
REV. 153, 153–55 (2009); see also Rachel Leingang, Ducey Record on Pardons, Commutations Not
Forgiving, AZ CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018 ), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2018/03/09/arizonadoug-ducey-pardons-commutations-not-forgiving/ [https://perma.cc/QF6K-9LEA] (“The political
implications of granting pardons, and especially commutations, can’t be ignored, and they exist regardless
of party affiliation, said Donna Hamm, the director of Middle Ground Prison Reform. Politicians are
always gauging which way the wind blows and trying to avoid angering the electorate, especially if
they’re planning for future offices, Hamm said. That’s why most governors or presidents have pardoned
a bunch of people on their way out the door, she said.”); Dafna Linzer, In Mississippi, Identities of Pardon
Applicants Must Be Public, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/in-mississippi-identities-of-pardon-applicants-must-be-public
[https://perma.cc/P79K-ZG46]
(documenting the political nature of and lack of transparency in clemency processes at both the federal
and state levels).
176 Memorandum from the Am. Bar Ass’n Capital Clemancy Res. Initiative, North Carolina Capital
Clemency Information 7 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.capitalclemencey.org/file/nc_clemency_memo02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8AP-YSDM].
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 351; see also Murray v. Netherlands,
App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/
VGB6-EBVD].
174
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Hutchinson: (1) whether the executive branch’s decision-making in the
clemency process is not unfettered (e.g., are its decisions subject to judicial
review?) (nature of review); (2) whether criminal law schemes permit release
in light of rehabilitation (scope of review); (3) whether those serving LWOP
know what they must do to be released (e.g., are there preestablished criteria
for release known at the time of sentencing? or, alternatively, does the
executive branch provide individualized reasons for its decisions?) (criteria
and conditions of release); and (4) whether there is a preestablished time
frame for review, not later than twenty-five years after sentencing, and there
are periodic reviews thereafter (time frame of review). In addition, to
determine whether there is a sufficient “prospect of release” in these states,
we also examined whether clemency provided a realistic opportunity for
release as required by Vinter. 180 As specified in Murray, mechanisms
resulting in no or few releases are suspect in this regard.181 Based on publicly
available information, as well as the applicable laws and policy statements
on clemency, we determined that there are at least twenty-five jurisdictions
in the United States that contravene these human rights standards.182
As catalogued below, four states provided no path to release whatsoever
for those sentenced to LWOP, while four others excluded rehabilitation as
grounds for release. In nine states, a grant of clemency for those serving
LWOP was so rare that it was practically impossible to obtain. In five other
states, the clemency process was so opaque that those seeking clemency
could not possibly know what they must do to secure release. In
Pennsylvania and Georgia, someone’s prospect for review and release varied
wildly depending on who held the governor’s office. Finally, in Missouri and
Tennessee, sentences could only be reviewed after an individual had served
at least twenty years, the maximum time frame for review recommended by
the ECtHR.
The following Sections detail the states’ deficient procedures, noting
parenthetically which ECtHR standard each group of states offends.

180

Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 346.
Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is reducible
de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the review
mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.” (citation
omitted)).
182 These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and the federal jurisdiction. A chart with a state-by-state analysis of clemency is on file with
the journal.
181
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1. States with No Prospect of Release (Prospect of Release)
First, a number of states provide no path to release for those sentenced
to life behind bars, in direct contravention of the human rights standards laid
out by the ECtHR in Vinter and Hutchinson.183 Nevada is one such state.
There, the state Board of Pardons Commissioners is prohibited by law from
commuting an LWOP sentence to one that would allow for parole.184 Those
serving LWOP in Nevada are also ineligible for a pardon because they have
not completed their sentences, an eligibility requirement in that state.185 In
Maine, a state where all life sentences lack the possibility of parole, those
serving life sentences are categorically ineligible for either a pardon or a
commutation. 186 This bar can only be waived in exceptional cases. 187
Similarly, in Kansas, the Governor cannot commute an LWOP sentence.188
It is unclear whether the Governor is also prohibited from pardoning
someone with such a sentence.189 In any event, pardons are extremely rare,
meant only to correct “a miscarriage of justice,” and not based on a person’s
individual rehabilitation as required by Vinter.190
Likewise, in Alabama, someone who is serving a life sentence that was
commuted from a death sentence will never be eligible for parole.191 Such a
person will also never be able to apply for a pardon unless based on a claim
of innocence. 192 As a further barrier to all those serving life sentences,
pursuant to the Alabama constitution, commutation and reprieves are only

183
Some states fall into multiple categories, but we chose to include them in the category where the
violation is most apparent and egregious.
184 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.085 (2020).
185 See NEV. BD. OF PARDONS, CRITERIA AND APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS: COMMUNITY CASES 2
(2019),
http://pardons.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pardonsnvgov/content/About/CriteriaAndApplication
Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2HS-385W].
186 See Susan Gagnon, Executive Clemency - Pardons and Commutations, ME. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://www.maine.gov/corrections/adult-community-corrections/pardon-board [https://perma.cc/J852TSXU].
187 Id.
188 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3705(b) (2021).
189 State v. Page, 57 P. 514, 516 (Kan. 1899) (“The effect of a pardon is to release from confinement;
to restore to the status of citizenship, and to the enjoyment of civil rights.”). But see Clemency, KAN.
DEP’T OF CORR. (July 9, 2020, 3:20 PM), http://www.doc.ks.gov/prb/clemency [https://perma.cc/MJ8SYRJ2] (“[A] pardon does not erase the conviction from the record, remove responsibility for the crime,
nor can it be the basis for a negative response to the question: ‘Have you ever been convicted of a
crime?’”).
190 See KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 189. For an overview of the pardon process in Kansas and
the infrequency of pardon grants, see Kansas Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION
OF RTS. PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/kansas-restoration-of-rightspardon-expungement-sealing [https://perma.cc/TZA3-NQAK].
191 ALA. CODE § 15-22-27(b), (d) (2021).
192 Id. § 15-22-27(a), (d).
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available to those with death sentences.193 No other authority in Alabama has
the power to commute sentences, and the executive’s clemency decisions are
not subject to judicial review.194 Consequently, in these states, regardless of
the changes that a person makes in her life and her strides in taking
responsibility for her actions, she will always be condemned to die in prison.
2.

States with No Prospect of Release Based on Rehabilitation
(Scope of Review)
In other states, those serving LWOP sentences might be able to secure
release through the clemency process, but not on the basis of their
rehabilitation, as human rights law requires. In Oklahoma, for instance, those
sentenced to LWOP cannot apply for pardon and can only apply for
commutation if arguing that the punishment was unjust or excessive, not on
the basis of rehabilitation. 195 Likewise, in Vermont, someone who is
currently incarcerated can apply only for a pardon, the sole clemency
mechanism in that state, “in very unusual circumstances where there is
independent evidence of a gross miscarriage of justice not reviewable
through the courts.”196 There is no mechanism that allows for release on the
basis of rehabilitation in that state either.
In Louisiana, the state with the highest number of people serving
LWOP (almost one in three people in Louisiana prisons) and where all life
sentences lack the possibility of parole, release on the basis of rehabilitation
is very unlikely, if not impossible.197 First, those serving LWOP sentences in
193 The Alabama constitution provides that “[t]he governor shall have power to grant reprieves and
commutations to persons under sentence of death.” ALA. CONST. art. V, § 124, amend. 38.
194 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 105 So. 2d 66, 70 (Ala. 1958 ) (“If any clemency is to be extended to
the appellant, it must come from executive action.”); Scott v. State, 22 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 1945)
(observing that courts are “without authority in criminal cases to reduce the punishment fixed by the
jury”); Liddell v. State, 251 So. 2d 601, 606 (Ala. 1971) (observing that “only the Governor has the power
to grant reprieves and commutations to persons under sentence of death . . . . therefore, a court has no
power to . . . commute a death sentence imposed by a jury”).
195 See OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD., PARDON AND PAROLE BOARD FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT COMMUTATIONS 1 (2019), https://www.ok.gov/ppb/documents/FAQs%20
Commutations.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ET5-B3W6] (“The purpose of a commutation is to correct an unjust
or excessive sentence in relation to the range of punishment for the crimes of conviction. A commutation
is not intended to serve as an early release mechanism.”); OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD., PARDON AND
PAROLE BOARD FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PARDONS 1 (2019), https://www.ok.gov/ppb/
documents/FAQs%20Pardons.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCR7-24TP].
196 VERMONT GOVERNOR’S GUIDELINES FOR PARDON CONSIDERATION 1, https://governor.vermont.
gov/sites/scott/files/documents/pardon%20application.FINAL%202017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK6HFXUJ]; Vermont, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.cjpf.org/clemency-vt [https://perma.cc/
8AMU-YLKP].
197 Lea Skene, Louisiana’s Life Without Parole Sentencing the Nation’s Highest — and Some Say
That Should Change, ADVOCATE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/
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Louisiana are ineligible to apply for a pardon. 198 Second, in order to be
eligible for commutation, someone must demonstrate, among other things,
that he “possess[es] a marketable job skill, either through previous
employment history or through successful completion of vocational training
while incarcerated.”199 Consequently, rehabilitation alone is not enough. This
is compounded by how rare commutations are in the state in general. From
2008 to 2016, then-Governor Bobby Jindal only commuted the LWOP
sentences of three people, one of whom was his butler.200
In New Mexico, the current Executive Clemency Guidelines specify
that a commutation “will normally be considered only in cases of unusual
meritorious service.” 201 The guidelines offer the following examples of
“unusual meritorious service”: (1) saving the life of an inmate or prison
employee; (2) helping to stop an insurrection which threatens the
administration’s control of an institution; and (3) risking serious bodily harm
in attempting to secure the release of a hostage. 202 An application for a
commutation must be accompanied by a supervising authority certifying the
validity of the claim of “unusual meritorious service.” 203 Incarcerated
individuals are also ineligible for a pardon.204 Thankfully, at least in 2016,
only one person was serving LWOP in New Mexico.205 On the whole, the
above-mentioned states are thus out of line with human rights standards,
because they offer no prospect of release based on rehabilitation grounds
alone.

article_f6309822-17ac-11ea-8750-f7d212aa28f8.html [https://perma.cc/R52V-ETG5]; Elizabeth Crisp
& David Mitchell, See the List: Jindal Grants Clemency to Personal Butler -- a Convicted Killer -- Plus
20 Other People, ADVOCATE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/
article_fac55ac5-4692-5dc5-bff7-8ca12b75947f.html [https://perma.cc/9SS4-YGPG].
198 See Application for Pardon Consideration, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR.,
https://doc.louisiana.gov/imprisoned-person-programs-resources/pardons-parole/application-for-pardon
-consideration/ [https://perma.cc/BHQ8-JFST].
199 LA. PARDON BD., COMMUTATION INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS, https://s32082.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/application.for_.commutation.of_.sentence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCA4LD5J].
200 See Lea Skene & Sam Karlin, Will Gov. John Bel Edwards Ramp Up Use of Clemency Power as
Part of Criminal Justice Reform Efforts?, ADVOCATE (Feb. 1, 2020, 3:45 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_9769c546-4440-11ea-a045-87b5ee818f05.html
[https://perma.cc/L6L4-5C2X].
201 STATE OF N.M., EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY GUIDELINES, https://www.governor.state.nm.us/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/Executive-Clemency-Guidelines_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPY4-QFF7].
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 10.
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3.

States with Opaque and Irregular Clemency Processes (Criteria
and Conditions for Release)
In some states, the clemency process is so opaque that it is difficult, if
not impossible, for those seeking clemency to know what they must do to
secure release. As set out above, this, too, runs afoul of the human rights
standards laid out above. For instance, while those serving LWOP sentences
in Maryland are technically eligible to apply for a commutation, the process
for applying is completely opaque and utterly confusing.206 Additionally, a
pardon is out of the question, because all people who are currently
incarcerated are ineligible.207
In Florida, clemency is considered to be “an act of mercy.”208 In other
words, clemency is not something that an individual can work towards
throughout her sentence. Rather, it depends on the subjective compassion of
the executive branch. This understanding of clemency is reflected in the
rules, which are opaque, unpredictable, and uncertain. First, according to the
rules governing the process, “[t]he Governor has the unfettered discretion to
deny clemency at any time, for any reason.”209 However, those serving all
life sentences are categorially ineligible for a pardon. 210 This leaves
commutation as the only path to release for those sentenced to life
imprisonment. 211 It is also unclear how many people are granted
commutations because these statistics are not publicly available.212 Further
contributing to this opacity, all records and documents gathered during the
clemency process are considered confidential and not available to “any
person except members of the Clemency Board and their staff.” 213
Consequently, when an individual is denied clemency, he has no right to
know why. Essentially all of the safeguards ensuring transparency and

206 See Maryland, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.cjpf.org/clemency-md [https://perma.cc/
LX93-L8A5] (“The Maryland Secretary of State webpage does very little to explain the
pardon/commutation application process, and confusingly suggests that the process starts at that office.”).
207 Maryland Parole Commission FAQs Index, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS.,
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/about/FAQmpc.shtml [https://perma.cc/3GP8-RWWD] (“No petition for
pardon shall be considered while the petitioner is incarcerated.”).
208 FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., RULES OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 3, https://www.fcor.state.
fl.us/docs/clemency/clemency_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E2F-2H3T].
209 Id.
210 The clemency rules require completion of a sentence in order to apply for a pardon, which is
impossible for those sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 6.
211 FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., supra note 208, at 4–6.
212 The number of commutations granted in Florida is not available in any publicly available report.
For all publicly available reports, see Reports/Publications, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV.,
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/reports.shtml [https://perma.cc/PJ6W-WPNS].
213 FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV., supra note 208, at 18.
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predictability that the ECtHR deemed essential when reviewing Bulgaria’s
clemency process in Harakchiev are absent in Florida.214
In contravention of the human rights standard laid out in Vinter
requiring that there be preestablished criteria for release and review
processes for life sentences known at the time of sentencing, there is no
formal application for or guidelines governing the clemency process in
Mississippi.215 There is also no constitutional requirement that a Governor
respond to a clemency petition.216 Moreover, Phillip Bryant, the Mississippi
Governor from 2012 to 2020, said that he would only grant commutation in
the case of wrongful conviction, thereby cementing that release on the basis
of rehabilitation would not be possible during his tenure.217
The clemency process in North Carolina is also shrouded in secrecy.
The process for applying and criteria for obtaining a commutation or pardon
are completely opaque, with the government’s website dedicated to
clemency devoid of any helpful guidance about the process. 218 The only
direction is provided by statute, which stipulates as follows:
Every application for pardon must be made to the Governor in writing, signed
by the party convicted, or by some person in his behalf. And every such
application shall contain the grounds and reasons upon which the executive
pardon is asked, and shall be in every case accompanied by a certified copy of
the indictment, and the verdict and judgment of the court thereon. 219

In addition, the Governor is under no obligation to make any information
concerning a denial of clemency public.220 It is thus completely unclear what
grounds allow for release of someone serving an LWOP sentence in North
Carolina. This, too, is out of line with past ECtHR jurisprudence, which
concluded that a clemency process was deficient when the executive failed
to give reasons for its decisions.221
214

See Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 443.
AM. BAR ASS’N, CAPITAL CLEMENCY PROJECT, MISSISSIPPI CAPITAL CLEMENCY INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM 3–4 (2017), https://www.capitalclemency.org/resource/mississippi-capital-clemencymemo/ [https://perma.cc/3U3F-G5S6].
216 Id. at 4.
217 Huma Khan, Pardon No More? Mississippi’s New Governor Eyes Tougher Rules for Clemency,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/pardon-no-moremississippis-new-governor-eyes-tougher-rules-for-clemency [https://perma.cc/RV4T-KZ79].
218 See Governor’s Clemency Office, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/adultcorrections/governors-clemency-office [https://perma.cc/3YMW-G5QV].
219 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 147-21 (2021).
220 AM. BAR ASS’N, CAPITAL CLEMENCY PROJECT, NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL CLEMENCY
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 5 (2017), https://www.capitalclemency.org/file/nc_clemency_memo02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSQ4-SD7P].
221 See Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08, ¶ 59 (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/TZ2Z-PX4U].
215
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The publicly available information about how to obtain either a pardon
or a commutation in Nebraska is scant, and the criteria are unclear as well.222
Additionally, clemency review has come to a near standstill since 2018.223
The backlog of clemency petitions became so egregious that a bill was
recently introduced that would force the Board of Pardons in Nebraska to
review clemency applications every ninety days.224
4.

States with No Prospect of Release De Facto (Prospect of
Release)
In some states, clemency is so rarely granted that it is almost
nonexistent, rendering such schemes problematic under human rights law
because LWOP sentences are de facto irreducible.225 Being granted clemency
in Arizona has been characterized as rarer than being struck by lightning,
with commutation in particular being described as “all but dead.”226 Statistics
support that characterization. From 2015 to 2018, the Governor of Arizona
only granted one pardon and five commutations, all but one of which were
for people facing imminent death who were released on compassionate
grounds.227 Additionally, by law, those “sentenced to natural life” in Arizona
will never be eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release,
or release from confinement on any basis. 228 This means that obtaining a
pardon, statistically an exceedingly rare prospect, is the only possible avenue
for those sentenced to natural life.229

222

See Commutation of Sentence, STATE OF NE. BD. OF PARDONS, https://pardons.nebraska.gov/
commutation-sentence [https://perma.cc/3MCT-6NSC].
223 See RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, supra note 127 (“Board processes appear to have come to a
virtual standstill in 2018 after the retirement of a long-time staffer, but regular hearings may resume in
2020.”).
224 JoAnne Young, Bill Would Force Nebraska Pardons Board to Meet and Consider Applications,
LINCOLN J. STAR (Jan. 24, 2020), https://journalstar.com/legislature/bill-would-force-nebraska-pardonsboard-to-meet-and-consider-applications/article_a094f8d0-fd6e-5e94-9861-a9d5157d91f7.html [https://
perma.cc/CJ3T-X6FM]; Paul Hammel, Nebraska Pardons Board Met Only Twice Last Year, Denying
People ‘A Fresh Start,’ Senators Told, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Jan 27, 2020), https://omaha.com/stateand-regional/nebraska-pardons-board-met-only-twice-last-year-denying-people-a-fresh-start-senatorstold/article_1c1e0fbe-fc5a-579a-81d0-af4a65f7bb02.html [https://perma.cc/K675-KD55].
225 See Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10, ¶ 100 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
fre?i=001-138893 [https://perma.cc/VGB6-EBVD] (“Finally, in assessing whether the life sentence is
reducible de facto it may be of relevance to take account of statistical information on prior use of the
review mechanism in question, including the number of persons having been granted a pardon.”).
226 Leingang, supra note 175.
227 Id.
228 Arizona law distinguishes between those subject to “natural life” and those to “life” who may at
some point be eligible for release. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (2021) (“A defendant who is
sentenced to natural life is not eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release
from confinement on any basis.”).
229 See id. §§ 13-751, 31-443.
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In Connecticut, commutations of life sentences were once routine.230
However, in 2007, the attorney general of Connecticut issued an opinion that
reversed that trend. 231 In response to a request from the state’s Board of
Pardons for clarity about its authority to commute non-parole eligible
offenses, the attorney general concluded that “[the] power to commute a
parole ineligible sentence and transform it to a parole eligible sentence is
barred by the express language of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1).” 232
Essentially, commutations of LWOP sentences are unlawful according to
this opinion. While not binding, the opinion is considered “highly
persuasive,” and it is unclear if any LWOP sentences have been commuted
since 2007.233
Pardons are not available to those serving life sentences in Hawaii,
leaving commutation as the only route to release.234 On a positive note, when
an LWOP sentence is imposed, as a matter of course, the court directs the
director of public safety and the Hawaii paroling authority to prepare an
application for the Governor to commute that sentence to life imprisonment
with parole at the end of twenty years of imprisonment, which is in line with
the human rights standard on the time frame for review.235 However, in fiscal
year 2019, the first year that the statistics on commutations were reported in
Hawaii, not a single commutation was granted. 236 The following year,
however, five commutations were granted.237 It is unclear how many of those
were commutations of LWOP sentences.
In Illinois, the Governor only approved two commutations in 2017,
three in 2016, zero in 2015, and two in 2014. 238 Moreover, the state’s
230

NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, SEARCHING FOR CLEMENCY IN
(2020), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CT_4_15_A%20CACL
%20Clemency_Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EYM-NGAY].
231 Id. at 5 n.42.
232 Id. at 5 (quoting Office of the Attorney General State of Connecticut, Opinion No. 2007-18,
2007 WL 2800958 (Conn. A.G. Sept. 20, 2007)).
233 Id. at 5 & n.42.
234 See STATE OF HAW. EXEC. CHAMBERS, PARDON APPLICATION 1 (2018), https://dps.hawaii.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pardon-Application-.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QF2-67Y2].
235 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-656 (2021).
236 HAW. PAROLING AUTH., 2019 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FY 2019, JULY 1, 2018 TO
JUNE 30, 2019, https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-Annual-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9Q5X-CVFJ].
237 HAW. PAROLING AUTHORITY, 2020 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FY 2019, JULY 1, 2018 TO
JUNE 30, 2020, https://dps.hawaii.gov/hpa/files/2020/10/2020-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WR5Z-SBQZ].
238 See STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 41ST ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31,
2017, at 13, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb16anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CA4LAFF]; STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 40TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2016,
THE CONSTITUTION STATE 5
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statistical reports on clemency do not specify whether any of these were
commutations of LWOP sentences. 239 In Massachusetts, only one
commutation has been granted since 2000.240 More difficult still, as a matter
of policy, commutations and pardons of those who are currently incarcerated
are rarely granted.241 Likewise, the Minnesota Board of Pardons has granted
only four pardons or commutations of active sentences since at least 1992,
the first year that the state’s clemency statistics were publicly available.242
This trend of scant clemency grants repeats in state after state across the
United States. In Montana, from 2012 to 2017, the only years for which
statistics are available, not a single commutation was granted, and those
currently incarcerated are ineligible for a pardon.243 In New Hampshire, only
three pardons and two sentence commutations have been granted since
1996. 244 Also, there are no standards of review. 245 Rhode Island has not
granted a pardon, the only form of clemency in the state, to a living person

at 16, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb16anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5BN-KDTQ];
STATE OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 39TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2015, at 15,
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/prb15anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKK7-GDNC]; STATE
OF ILL., PRISONER REV. BD., 38TH ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 2014, at 15,
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/prb/Documents/FY14%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
537H-9ZX7].
239 The reports only list the number of commutations per year but does not specify the length of the
sentences that were commuted. See sources cited supra note 238.
240 NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, WILLIE HORTON’S SHADOW:
CLEMENCY IN MASSACHUSETTS 3 (2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CACL%20
Clemency%20MA_Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ26-QN84].
241 Id. at 2–3; Memorandum from Charles D. Baker, Governor of Mass., Executive Clemency
Guidelines 2 (Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/executive-clemency-guidelines-2212020/
download [https://perma.cc/L5RL-NTMM].
242 See Annual Reports, MN DEP’T OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/about/pardon-board/annualreports/ [https://perma.cc/J8W8-PMU4].
243 See STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2017,
https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2017FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY45-68CP]; STATE OF
MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/
StatisticalData/2016FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FB2-G53U]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS &
PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2015, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/
2015FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS95-598P]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE,
STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2014, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2014FiscalYear.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6N6-ERX6]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA
FISCAL YEAR 2013, https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2013FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M356-5HUA]; STATE OF MONT. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, STATISTICAL DATA FISCAL YEAR 2012,
https://bopp.mt.gov/_docs/StatisticalData/2012FiscalYear.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9BA-P2QK].
244 N.H. Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/new-hampshire-restoration-of-rights-pardonexpungement-sealing/#II_Pardon_policy_practice [https://perma.cc/82D2-XS2G].
245 Id.
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in over a decade.246 There are also no eligibility requirements, and the process
can change at the whim of the Governor.247
5.

States in Which Clemency Is Highly Unpredictable and Political
(Criteria and Conditions for Release)
In some states, whether clemency is granted, especially for those
serving life sentences, is extremely dependent on who is in power, thereby
rendering the process very unpredictable and variable. Alarmingly, this is the
case in a number of states with a particularly high number of people serving
LWOP sentences. One example of a state where clemency is very politicized
is Pennsylvania, the state with the second largest population of people—
5,230—serving LWOP sentences. 248 As the website of the Pennsylvania
Board of Pardons clarifies, those individuals “serving life sentences must
apply for commutation of their life sentence as their only means of release
since there is no such thing as parole for lifers in Pennsylvania.” 249 In
Pennsylvania, over a period of nearly twenty years (1995 to 2014), there
were only six commutations of life sentences.250 This is in part due to a state
constitutional amendment in 1997 that required a unanimous vote from the
Board of Pardons for any commutation of a life sentence.251 In addition, the
clemency process is extremely political, since two of the five members of
the Board of Pardons are elected officials (the attorney general and the
Lieutenant Governor), and the Governor must approve every
commutation. 252 Moreover, Republican governors in Pennsylvania are
significantly less likely to grant a commutation of a life sentence than
Democrats. Since 1995, only one commutation of a life sentence was granted
246 Rhode Island Restoration of Rights, Pardon, Expungement & Sealing, RESTORATION OF RTS.
PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/rhode-island-restoration-of-rights-pardo
n-expungement-sealing/ [https://perma.cc/PX7Y-Y7W5].
247 Id.; 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-10-1 (2019) (stating that “any rules and regulations respecting
[pardon application] filing and hearing that [the governor] may from time to time prescribe”).
248 See PA. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cor.pa.gov/
About%20Us/Statistics/Documents/Budget%20Documents/2019%20Inmate%20Profile.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/LW9D-7E27]; PA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPORT 2018, https://www.cor.pa.
gov/About%20Us/Statistics/Documents/Reports/2018%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3TWY-M38L].
249 Clemency Applications, PA. BD. OF PARDONS, https://www.bop.pa.gov/application-process/
Pages/clemency.aspx [https://perma.cc/X454-ZHEN].
250 Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), PA. BD. OF PARDONS, https://www.bop.pa.gov/
Statistics/Pages/Commutation-of-Life-Sentences.aspx [https://perma.cc/ENK7-7JYJ].
251 NYU CTR. ON ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., STATE CLEMENCY PROJECT, THE DEMISE OF CLEMENCY FOR
LIFERS IN PENNSYLVANIA 9 (2020), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/CACL%20ClemencyPA_Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7ZW-2752].
252 Id. at 1 (“Among the five-member Board are the [publicly]-elected Attorney General and the
Lieutenant Governor, whose presence undermines the political insulation normally associated with
pardon boards.”).
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by a Republican governor (despite there being three of them during this
period).253 By comparison, the two Democratic governors granted forty-three
commutations of life sentences, with thirty-eight being granted under
Governor Tom Wolf.254
Likewise, in Georgia, where 1,655 people are currently serving LWOP
sentences, the efficacy of the clemency process seems to turn on who
controls the Governor’s office.255 In Georgia, commutation is the only path
to release for those individuals. 256 Under Governor John Nathan Deal, in
fiscal year 2017, 1,215 commutations were granted.257 In stark contrast, in
fiscal year 2019, under Governor Brian Kemp, not a single commutation was
approved.258
6.

States Without a Preestablished Time Frame for Review (Time
Frame for Review)
On a positive note, in accordance with human rights standards, most
states allow for a clemency review sooner than twenty-five years after
sentencing for those who are eligible for clemency.259 Missouri is an outlier
in this respect. An individual currently incarcerated in Missouri can only
apply for clemency if she has served more than twenty-five years, has an
actual innocence claim, or is over seventy years old with at least twelve years
served.260 There is also no guarantee of how long the clemency review will
take or when it will commence after someone has applied.261 Consequently,

253 Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), supra note 250; Former Pennsylvania
Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/former-governors/pennsylvania/
[https://perma.cc/7D6C-X9U2].
254 Commutation of Life Sentences (1971 - Present), supra note 250.
255 DATA MGMT. SECTION, GA. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE STATISTICAL PROFILE, ACTIVE LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE 4 (2020), http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/sites/all/themes/gdc/pdf/Profile_life_wo_
parole_2020_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/S68T-YD69].
256 See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.10 (2015).
257 STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, INFORMED, DATA DRIVEN PAROLE DECISIONS, ANNUAL
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 22, https://pap.georgia.gov/publications/annual-reports [https://perma.cc/
59XL-TJFN].
258 STATE BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2019,
at 25, https://pap.georgia.gov/publications/annual-reports [https://perma.cc/8F82-85TL].
259 See chart discussed supra note 182.
260 STATE OF MO. DEP’T OF CORR., APPLICATION FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, CONFINED
APPLICANT (2020), https://doc.mo.gov/media/pdf/application-executive-clemency-confined-applicant
[https://perma.cc/E33J-2A4D].
261 See MO. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, https://doc.mo.gov/divisions/probationparole/executive-clemency [https://perma.cc/699C-JBKJ] (“There is no set time frame for completion of
the clemency process and Governor decision.”).
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as of December 2019, there was a backlog of 3,500 clemency cases.262 Thus,
many seeking clemency will not start the process until well after twenty-five
years from their date of sentencing. In addition, in some states with life
sentences with parole, parole review is only available after twenty-five years.
For example, in Tennessee, those serving life sentences can only be eligible
for parole after fifty-one years.263
IV. HUMAN DIGNITY UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Although the United States’ unwavering retributivist approach to life
sentences is out of line with human rights standards and—as we will describe
below—much of the rest of the world, our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
may offer an escape from unending damnation for over 160,000 among us
sentenced to die in prison. 264 Human dignity, a concept embedded in the
scrutiny that the Eighth Amendment requires, unifies us with the global
community, both figuratively and doctrinally.265 Vitally, Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is dynamic and globally oriented in ways that other areas of
the law are not. Whether punishment offends human dignity is evaluated in
line with the evolving standards of decency and is, in part, understood by
reference to the benchmarks set by the rest of the world. Herein lies the path
to redeeming justice in the United States.
A. Human Dignity as Fundamental to the Eighth Amendment
Affirming that all people have the capacity for redemption is possible
under the Eighth Amendment. As other legal scholars have recounted, there
is a latent feature of the Eighth Amendment that could restore hope in the
law: human dignity.266 Since human dignity is the foundation of the right to

262 Editorial, Gov. Mike Parson Is Sitting on a Backlog of 3,500 Clemency Cases. Why Won’t He
Act?, KAN. CITY STAR, (Dec. 26, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/
article238720168.html [https://perma.cc/A3XY-F289].
263 Lichtenberg, supra note 13, at 42; see also Rahim Buford, Ashlee Sellers, Jeannie Alexander,
Janet Wolf, Dawn Deaner & Josh Spickler, Opinion, Meaningful Life-Sentence Reform, Especially for
Young Offenders, Needed, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 30, 2020), https://eu.tennessean.com/story/opinion/
2020/03/30/meaningful-life-sentence-reform-especially-young-offenders-needed/2929179001/ [https://
perma.cc/D6C2-KC3U] (“One of our most drastic sentencing changes came in 1995, when Tennessee
doubled its life sentence, from a baseline of 25 years -- the current national average -- to a draconian 51
years. With this extreme increase, a ‘life’ sentence in Tennessee essentially came to mean the same thing
as life without parole. It meant death in prison and no second chances for anyone convicted of first-degree
murder.”).
264 NELLIS, supra note 113, at 5.
265 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2140 (“The Court has said that dignity is the touchstone of the [Eighth]
Amendment’s prohibition . . . .”).
266 E.g., id. at 2140–42.
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redemption in other jurisdictions, it opens the door to a redemptive reading
of the Eighth Amendment.
Over the last four decades, dignity has featured prominently in the case
law concerning cruel and unusual punishment, without much specificity
about what it meant. A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court first proclaimed
in Trop v. Dulles that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man.”267 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Eighth
Amendment was said to embody the “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”268 Roper v. Simmons
affirmed that “[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the
Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the
dignity of all persons.”269 In so holding, the Court has aimed “to protect the
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance.”270
In these cases, the Court portrays dignity as the central concept that
underlies all Eighth Amendment inquiries, rather than as a set of legal
requirements to satisfy. Taking the Supreme Court at its word, dignity could
be used as an interpretive principle from which we could derive a set of
corresponding duties or protections, to thereby help courts adjudicate Eighth
Amendment claims. 271 This might be counterintuitive, since the U.S.
Constitution does not explicitly reference dignity amongst its provisions.
However, dignity remains a core principle of the U.S. Constitution, with the
U.S. Supreme Court reading dignity into the Constitution nearly a thousand
times. 272 As Justice William Brennan Jr. underscored, “the constitutional
ideal of human dignity” is the foundation of U.S. law.273
Despite dignity’s omnipresence in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
its content remains murky, confounding legal scholars and practitioners
alike. So much so that scholars have come to widely divergent
understandings of what dignity in the Eighth Amendment context provides,
with some taking a very communitarian view of it and others a much more
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356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
269 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
270 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
271 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 655, 681 (2008).
272 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172–73, 178 (2011);
see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) (“A State; useful and valuable as the
contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired
importance.”).
273 Henry, supra note 272, at 171.
268
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individualistic one. 274 For instance, Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry
characterized the strand of dignity in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as an
effort to protect the “collective virtue” of the human species.275 In Professor
Henry’s reading of this line of cases, inhumane punishment is prohibited
because it would degrade “the totality of human life.”276 On the other end of
the spectrum, after a more holistic review of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, including cases that do not explicitly reference dignity,
Professor Meghan Ryan linked dignity to the individualism of the
offender.277 Professor Ryan ties individualism to two facets of the Eighth
Amendment analysis—the humanness facet and the proportionality facet.278
The humanness facet prohibits punishments that are so extreme and
horrendous that no human being, regardless of his crime, should be subjected
to them.279 The proportionality facet, on the other hand, mandates that the
offender should not receive greater punishment than he deserves.280 In other
words, the punishment must be proportionate to the crime.
These studies share an inductive approach to dignity, relying on the
judicial discourse in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to discern dignity’s
content. There are several limitations to exclusively employing this approach
to understanding dignity’s role in the Eighth Amendment. First, as openly
acknowledged by several legal scholars, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
is “a mess.”281 Compounding that uncertainty is the lack of clarity generally
about the meaning of human dignity and its implications for U.S.

274 Compare McCrudden, supra note 271, at 699 (concluding that “the predominant approach to
dignity in the US Supreme Court . . . is more individualistic”), and Ryan, supra note 24, at 2132 (finding
“that Eighth Amendment dignity means the individuality of an offender must be respected”), with Henry,
supra note 272, at 220–29 (describing “the collective virtue of humanity” as “less concerned with
individual dignity per se than with how a society values the totality of human life” and linking this
conception of dignity to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
275 Henry, supra note 272, at 220–29.
276 Id. at 221.
277 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2132.
278 Id. at 2132, 2144 (“One facet of this concentration on the individual is that the offender should
not receive greater punishment than he deserves. Punishment for some other reason—such as to further
society in some way—loses sight of the individual. The other facet of the focus on the individual is
emphasizing the fact that the individual is a human being. There are some punishments that are so
inhumane, so uncivilized, that no one should be punished in that manner—not even humans who have
committed the vilest of offenses.”).
279 Id. at 2132–33, 2146.
280 Id. at 2144.
281 Id. at 2131; see also Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 773 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s analysis of human dignity in most death
penalty cases is weak and meaningless.”); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (describing the Eighth Amendment proportionality test as
“messy and complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint” (citation omitted)).
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constitutional law.282 Moreover, from the case law alone, it is difficult to
draw out how dignity relates to the standards developed by the Court, hence
the wildly divergent characterization of the norm by legal scholars who have
looked closely at this jurisprudence. Quite plainly, the existing case law does
little to suggest how dignity is connected to the Eighth Amendment common
law standards, stagnating further development of this jurisprudence.
Paradoxically, the case law seems to call for further expansion. 283
Indeed, the Court has specified that both facets of human dignity described
by Professor Ryan are just the minimum of what dignity requires. For
example, Gregg, a case she uses as an illustration of the proportionality
facet, 284 specifies that for a punishment to accord with human dignity, it
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’”285 To that end, at a
bare minimum, a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, but
dignity also demands more. Likewise, in Ford, a case linked to the
humanness facet, 286 the Court concluded that “the Eighth Amendment’s
proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the common
law in 1789.” 287 In other words, these prohibitions are the floor, not the
ceiling, of what dignity requires. Thus, looking at the existing case law alone
does not illuminate the full scope of the norm and what it was meant to
protect. The Court has explicitly said as much: “To enforce the
Constitution’s protection of human dignity,” the Court must “look[] to the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,” 288 thereby recognizing that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not
fastened to the obsolete.” 289 Inherently, understanding dignity requires a
more profound inquisition.

As underscored by Professor Darren Hutchinson, dignity’s ambiguity and indeterminacy has also
enabled conservative justices to use it to promote conservative perspectives on race and racism, like
colorblind constitutionalism. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial
Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 26, 29–30, 61 (2017).
283 Goodman, supra note 281, at 778 (“The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates the need
for the Court to develop a test or standard for consistent decision-making with regard to human dignity.”).
284 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2147–48.
285 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The Court
mentioned two instances when a punishment is excessive: (1) when it inflicts unnecessary and wanton
pain and (2) when it is out of proportion with the offense. Id.
286 Ryan, supra note 24, at 2150.
287 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (emphasis added).
288 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
289 Id. at 708 (quotation marks omitted). But compare Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019),
a recent Eighth Amendment decision in which the Court failed to analyze (or even mention) the evolving
standards of decency when evaluating the constitutionality of Missouri’s method of lethal injection.
282
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B. Reading Human Rights into the Evolving Standards of Decency
Specifically, evaluating whether punishment is indecent290 in the current
age necessitates assessing “contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction.”291 Such an assessment requires that courts examine
the “objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction”
as a means of avoiding the transposition of a judge’s ideology into this
analysis.292 In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has often looked to the laws
and practices of international and foreign jurisdictions as persuasive
authority when conducting such inquiries. 293 As the Court explained in
Graham v. Florida, there is a “longstanding practice in noting the global
consensus against the sentencing practice in question.” 294 The “laws and
practices of other nations and international agreements” are thus instructive
when interpreting the Eighth Amendment.295 State courts have followed suit,
looking to comparative and international law sources when reviewing
challenges to the constitutionality of punishment, either under the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the analogous provision under their
state constitutions.296
Courts may thus look to other jurisdictions with more robust accounts
of human dignity in their jurisprudence when conducting their Eighth
290 The Court uses both the terms dignity and decency in its Eighth Amendment case law. However,
the court evokes “evolving standards of decency” as a legal standard and “dignity” as an underlying
rationale for the Eighth Amendment. Hall, 572 U.S. at 708.
291 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
292 Id.
293 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[A]t least from the time of the Court’s decision
in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive
for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); see
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by [intellectually disabled] offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”). For a comprehensive review
of the citations of international and foreign sources in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, see Sarah H.
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2006). The citation of
international and comparative sources in U.S. case law has also not been without its criticism. See, e.g.,
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57
(2004); Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007). Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, was a notable critic of the practice.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be
rejected out of hand.”).
294 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010).
295 Id. at 82.
296 MARTHA F. DAVIS, JOHANNA KALB & RISA E. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 278 (2d ed. 2018). For a comprehensive survey of state courts looking to international
human rights law to inform their decision-making, see OPPORTUNITY AGENDA & PHRGE, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS (2014).
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Amendment analysis. And human rights law is a natural source.297 Just as
human dignity is the foundational concept in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, it is also one of the fundamental justifications for human
rights law.298 As Eleanor Roosevelt explained, human dignity was included
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “in order to emphasize that
every human being is worthy of respect . . . [and] was meant to explain why
human beings have rights to begin with.” 299 That is not to say that the
theoretical meaning of human dignity is well settled by any means—quite
the contrary.300 In the past, however, such agreement was not needed for
states to agree on common legal commitments grounded in human dignity.301
Rather, by taking a human rights pragmatist’s approach to the Eighth
Amendment, we can deduce through an examination of human dignity’s
robust jurisprudence in other jurisdictions whether there is consensus about
its implications.302 A human rights pragmatist derives the meaning of dignity
not from theory, but from its use in practice. 303 Using this approach, we
cannot glean the meaning of human dignity from what any single judge says.
Instead, in order to be incorporated into the public meaning of the phrase, it
must be “taken up by the relevant communities of discourse” in the
international community.304 One of the advantages of using this approach is
that, as Professor Christopher McCrudden points out, “different jurisdictions
share a sense of what dignity requires, and this enables a dialogue to take
place between judges on the interpretation of human rights norms, based on
a supposedly shared assumption.”305

297 Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into
Criteria and Content, 27 HOWARD L.J. 145, 213–14 (1984).
298 David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry
into Criteria and Content, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 263, 274 (Rowan Cruft,
S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo eds., 2015). This also corresponds to Professor Jeremy Waldron’s
theory of ius gentium. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 138 (2005) (characterizing ius gentium as a site of “the accumulated wisdom of the world on
rights and justice”).
299 McCrudden, supra note 271, at 677.
300 Luban, supra note 298, at 275; see also JEREMY WALDRON & MEIR DAN-COHEN, DIGNITY,
RANK, AND RIGHTS 15 (2012) (“There does not seem to be any canonical definition of ‘dignity’ in the
law.”).
301 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING,
AND INTENT 284–302 (1999).
302 See Luban, supra note 298, at 275–76.
303 Id. at 275. In general, pragmatism is grounded in the “notion that ideas and concepts, including
legal ones, are inherently ‘social’ and accordingly dependent on the human environment and culture in
which they are produced and thrive.” ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES 92 (2016).
304 Luban, supra note 298, at 275.
305 McCrudden, supra note 271, at 695.
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The human rights pragmatist approach to human dignity is quite
instructive for Eighth Amendment analyses in particular. First, the approach
accords with the U.S. Supreme Court’s evaluation of “evolving standards of
decency,” which counsels courts to look at global trends as objective indicia
of what human dignity requires. 306 In line with this jurisprudence, other
conceptions of human dignity—and in particular as they relate to cruel and
unusual punishment—could very well inform the bounds that this country
places on punishment. Second, the concept of human dignity is intrinsically
linked to prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. 307 As Professor
Jeremy Waldon explains, prohibitions on degrading treatment are closely
tied to human dignity in that “they address the most direct and alarming ways
in which human dignity might be assaulted—for example, conscious
attempts to treat people as having a sub-human status.” 308 Third, as was
discussed in Part II and will be fleshed out further below, the judicial
discourse connecting human dignity with cruel and usual punishment is quite
robust.309 Indeed, human rights and constitutional courts around the world
frequently invoke human dignity when determining the meaning and scope
of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment. 310 This extensive
jurisprudence makes the pragmatist approach particularly pertinent and
useful.
C. The Global Trend Towards the Right to Redemption
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of Eighth Amendment
prohibitions are not immutable and must be understood in line with evolving
standards of decency—sometimes informed by worldwide trends—looking
to human rights jurisprudence and comparative constitutional law can help
us to see more clearly what human dignity requires. Indeed, globally, there
is a growing consensus that LWOP sentences that lack any possibility of
review and release are cruel and unusual. There is also an increased emphasis
on the rehabilitative ideal. These global trends, taken together with the
human rights law described in Part II, could inform more robust protections
against inhuman and degrading punishment in the United States. Therefore,
the jurisprudence described below represents more than just the opinions of
far-flung jurisdictions—the decisions are the antecedents for building a
justice that respects human dignity and enables redemption in this country.
306

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
McCrudden, supra note 271, at 685–88.
308 Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 298, at 117, 119.
309 See McCrudden, supra note 271, at 695–96.
310 Id. at 686–88.
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1. The Right to Redemption in Europe
As the ECtHR pointed out in Vinter, “a large majority of Contracting
States either do not impose life sentences at all or, if they do impose life
sentences, provide some dedicated mechanism, integrated within the
sentencing legislation, guaranteeing a review of those life sentences after a
set period, usually after twenty-five years imprisonment.”311 Indeed, only ten
European countries permit LWOP sentences.312
In Europe, Germany has been the standard-bearer for the right to
redemption.313 In 1977, the German Constitutional Court became one of the
first courts in the world to declare life sentences that preclude any possibility
of ever regaining freedom as unconstitutional.314 The court found that if there
is no hope of release, then a life sentence is at odds with the principle of
human dignity enshrined in the German constitution, which is the highest
legal value in its constitutional order. 315 Harkening back to an earlier
decision, the court connected human dignity to the right to the free
development of one’s personality, concluding that everyone should enjoy a
sphere of autonomy in which they can shape her private life by developing
and protecting her individuality.316 Consequently, in the words of the court,
311

Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317, 348. The Vinter court relied heavily on
this trend among contracting states when concluding that a right to redemption existed in human rights
law. Id.
312 Berry, supra note 36, at 1075 n.206. (“These countries are Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta,
the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.”).
313 Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 96 (2011) (“Probably
the most important and influential nation to give a real substance to its dignity jurisprudence is
Germany.”); DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & CATHERINE APPLETON, LIFE IMPRISONMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS ANALYSIS 237 (2019).
314 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], 45 BVerfGE 187, June 21,
1977 (Ger.) [hereinafter Judgment of June 21, 1977], translation at http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/
dignity/45bverfge187.html [https://perma.cc/EGQ2-BH7A] (“The assessment of the constitutionality of
lifetime imprisonment especially with references to Article 1.1. of the Basic Law and the principle of the
rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) revealed that a humane execution of the lifetime imprisonment can only
be assured if the sentenced criminal has a concrete and principally attainable possibility to regain freedom
at a later point in time; for the core of human dignity is struck if the convicted criminal has to give up any
hope of regaining his freedom no matter how his personality develops.”).
315 Id. Specifically, Article 1, § 1 of the German constitution, called the Basic Law, states, “Human
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public authority.” Grundgesetz
[GG] art. 1, § 1. Likewise, the Italian constitution also expresses the rehabilitative ideal in criminal
punishment to human dignity, stipulating in Article 27, “Punishment cannot consist in treatment contrary
to human dignity [senso di umanità] and must aim at rehabilitating the condemned.” AHARON BARAK,
HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 53 (Daniel Kayros
trans., 2015) (alteration in original).
316 Judgment of June 21, 1977, supra note 314; see also 35 BVerfGE 202, June 5, 1973 (Ger.),
translation at https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=62 [https://perma.cc/VMU3-K6KE] (describing
the German constitution’s protection of human dignity “as the nucleus of the system of constitutional
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“[i]t would be inconsistent with human dignity . . . if the state were to claim
the right to forcefully strip a human of his freedom without [the human]
having at least the possibility to ever regain freedom.”317 Echoing a Kantian
understanding of human dignity, the court explained that the “offender may
not be turned into a mere object of [the state’s] fight against crime under
violation of his constitutionally protected right to social worth and
respect.”318
In arriving at this decision, the court derived the notion of
Behandlungsvollzug, which is comparable to the principle of rehabilitation,
from the principle of human dignity.319 Since Germany is a “social state,” the
court concluded that the state had a duty to foster rehabilitation and
reintegration, which should be a primary purpose of imprisonment, even for
those serving life sentences.320 For that reason, correctional facilities need to
do their utmost “to offset damaging consequences caused by the loss of
freedom and thereby especially counter all deforming alterations of
personality.” 321 As the ECtHR concluded in Vinter, the German
Constitutional Court concluded that the state’s duty corresponded with
certain rights of the individual who is being detained. More precisely, all
detained people have a “right to be prepared to reenter the society, even if he
will only after a long period of atonement for his crime have the possibility
to be obliged to handle a life in freedom.”322 It would run counter to human
dignity, the court concluded, if a human being never had the possibility or
hope of regaining freedom again, no matter the changes he made in his life.323
In its opinion, the German Constitutional Court went further still,
reading Behandlungsvollzug together with Rechtsstaat, or the principle of
legal certainty, to require a clear procedure and conditions for release to be

concerns”). It bears noting that there is no corresponding right to free development of personality in other
countries’ constitutions. However, in Vinter, the ECtHR found this right to be implicit in human dignity.
2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 347.
317 Judgment of June 21, 1977, supra note 314 (alteration in original).
318 Id. (alteration in original).
319 KARL LAIRD, ZEDEKIA GAINGOB AND TWO OTHERS V. THE STATE: A REPORT ON LIFE
IMPRISONMENT 51 (2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ZedekiaGaingob-v-The-State-A-Report-on-Life-Imprisonment.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6LV-69C9].
320 See id. at 51–52, 54; Judgment of June 21, 1977, supra note 314.
321 Judgment of 21 June 1977, supra note 314.
322 Id.
323 Id. (“The assessment of the constitutionality of lifetime imprisonment especially with references
to Article 1.1. of the Basic Law and the principle of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) revealed that a
humane execution of the lifetime imprisonment can only be assured if the sentenced criminal has a
concrete and principally attainable possibility to regain freedom at a later point in time; for the core of
human dignity is struck if the convicted criminal has to give up any hope of regaining his freedom no
matter how his personality develops.”).
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spelled out in national legislation.324 The court also required that review be
made by the judiciary.325 As a consequence, the prospect of release must be
guaranteed through means other than an executive pardon.326 This opinion by
the court shifted the procedure from reliance on executive pardon power to
reliance on judicial review of release. 327 In response to this decision, the
German legislature added a paragraph to the criminal code, requiring release
if: (1) fifteen years of the sentence had been served, (2) the degree of the
convicted person’s guilt no longer required continued detention,
(3) suspension was justified under the security interests of the general public,
and (4) the imprisoned person agreed.328
2. The Right to Redemption in Latin America
Europe is not alone. Because so few countries in Latin America employ
life sentences, Latin America has been referred to as a “life imprisonment
almost-free zone.” 329 Part of the reason for the region’s aversion to life
sentences is that nearly all Latin American countries take a rehabilitative
approach to punishment.330 For many years in Latin America, life sentences
only existed in six countries: Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico
(legal only in five of its thirty-two states), and Peru.331 In 2020, the region
added a seventh country when Colombia made certain crimes against
children punishable by life imprisonment.332
Even in those Latin American countries that permit life sentences, there
generally still exists a possibility of review and release, such that life
sentences are not unalterable. In Chile and Honduras, for example, all life
sentences have a possibility of parole and are thus reviewable and
reducible.333 Of those seven countries that permit life sentences, only four
permit LWOP sentences (Argentina, Cuba, Peru, and four states in
324

LAIRD, supra note 319, at 51.
Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 52.
328 Id.
329 Francisco Javier de Leon Villalba, Imprisonment and Human Rights in Latin America: An
Introduction, 98 PRISON J. 17, 26 (2018).
330 See id. at 19; see also Beatriz López Lorca, Life Imprisonment in Latin America, in LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 54 (Dirk van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton eds., 2016).
331 Lorca, supra note 330, at 43, 50.
332 Tatiana Arias & Stefano Pozzebon, Colombia Changes Constitution amid Allegations of Child
Rape by Soldiers, CNN (July 23, 2020, 7:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/23/americas/colombiamilitary-child-sex-abuse-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/B4FA-BFTM] (“Colombia has introduced the
possibility of a lifetime jail sentence for the rape or murder of children, following shocking allegations of
child sexual assault by members of the military . . . . Until now, jailing for life was not a penalty for any
crime in Colombia.”).
333 Villalba, supra note 329, at 26; Lorca, supra note 330, at 52.
325
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Mexico).334 As in many European countries, life sentences, including LWOP
sentences, that forbore the prospect of release have been found to be cruel
and unusual.335 The incompatibility of life imprisonment with human dignity
has been at the center of these determinations.336 In Peru, for instance, the
Constitutional Court held that life sentences are only constitutional insofar
as they provide a judicial mechanism for review and release; otherwise, they
undermine dignity and fail to account for rehabilitation. 337 In short, “the
offender must have the possibility of returning to society.”338 In Argentina,
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in 2006 that life sentences that lack a
judicial mechanism for release are unconstitutional because they seriously
damage “the intangibility of the human being.” 339 In only two countries,
Cuba and Mexico (specifically, only three Mexican states), is a life sentence
without parole the only option for life sentences.340
The understanding of resocialization as the aim of punishment derives
from the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), one of the
principal treaties that undergirds the Inter-American system of human
rights.341 Article 5.6 of the ACHR provides that “[p]unishments consisting of
deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social
readaptation of the prisoners.”342 In a case addressing juvenile life without
parole (JLWOP), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights further
affirmed that the “fundamental goal [of punishment] is to prepare
[individuals] to rejoin society, which means that sentences of incarceration
must focus on ensuring that persons sentenced to prison are willing and able
to conduct themselves as law-abiding members of society.” 343 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has also weighed in, finding that states
334

Lorca, supra note 330, at 52.
Id. at 54–62.
336 Id. at 54.
337 Id. at 61.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 56.
340 Id. at 52.
341 Villalba, supra note 329, at 19–20. For an explanation of why the United States does not abide
by the decisions of the Inter-American Commission and Court to the same degree as most Latin American
countries, see generally Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process
of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 20 HUM. RTS BRIEF 19 (2013), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/
tablas/r30736.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLR4-H6FW].
342 Pact of San José, Costa Rica, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5.6, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. The United States has also signed the American Convention on
Human Rights and accordingly must not undermine the object and purpose of the treaty.
343 Mendoza v. Argentina, Case 12.561, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 172/10, ¶ 140 (2010).
For background information about the role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as well
as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see “Inter-American Human Rights System,” INT’L JUST.
RESOURCE CTR., https://ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/ [https://perma.cc/L483-5MWT].
335
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have a special responsibility to ensure that people deprived of their liberty
have the conditions necessary to live with dignity and can enjoy their other
human rights to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances.344
The Resolution on Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, which is nonbinding but is
meant to guide states, also reflects the resocialization ideal of punishment.345
The principles are based on the concept that “punishments consisting of
deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform, social
readaptation and personal rehabilitation of those convicted; the reintegration
into society and family life; as well as the protection of both the victims and
society.”346
Since most Latin American states joined the Inter-American Human
Rights System at the same time as they transitioned to democracy, these
human rights principles became codified in their newly drafted
constitutions. 347 Consequently, the resocialization principle, essentially
another framing of the rehabilitative ideal that undergirds the right to
redemption, remains enshrined in many constitutions in Latin America.348
For example, the Brazilian Constitution of 1934 expressly banned life
imprisonment, providing that “[t]here shall be no penalty of banishment,
death, confiscation or of a perpetual character.”349
3. The Right to Redemption in Africa
Numerous jurisdictions in Africa have also found life sentences without
the possibility of parole to be cruel and unusual. For instance, in State v.
Tcoeib, the Supreme Court of Namibia declared that a sentence should never
be imposed if it “effectively amounts to a sentence which locks the gates of
the prison irreversibly for the offender without any prospect whatever of any
lawful escape from that condition for the rest of his or her natural life and
regardless of any circumstances which might subsequently arise.” 350 The
court thus considered a life sentence without the possibility of release to be
unconstitutional but concluded that the release scheme in Namibia was
344 See Juvenile Reeducation Inst. v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 152–53 (Sept. 2, 2004); Montero-Aranguren v.
Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 150, ¶ 87 (July 5, 2006).
345 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Res. 1/08, Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons
Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (ser. A) No. 26 (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
48732afa2.html [https://perma.cc/PF5G-G5PT].
346 Id. at 1.
347 Villalba, supra note 329, at 20–21.
348 Id. at 24; Lorca, supra note 330, at 54.
349 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 113(29) (1934) (Braz.).
350 State v. Tcoeib [2001] AHRLR 158, ¶ 20 (NaSC 1996) (Namib.).
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lawful because release was possible for those serving a life sentence.351 For
example, the court noted that, under the Prisons Act of 1959, the president
had the power to release any person “serving any period of imprisonment”
on probation or parole regardless of whether parole was foreseen at the time
of sentencing.352
In Angola, all life sentences are considered unlawful, because the
Angolan constitution explicitly provides that “[n]o sentence or security
measure that deprives or restricts freedom shall be perpetual in nature or of
an unlimited or undefined duration.”353 In Angola, no one can be incarcerated
for more than thirty years, regardless of age. 354 Life imprisonment or
imprisonment of unlimited or indefinite duration is also explicitly prohibited
by the constitution of Cape Verde.355 Moreover, in Mozambique, based on
Article 61 of the Mozambique constitution, penalties and security measures
that deprive or restrict freedom in perpetuity or for an unlimited or indefinite
time are also prohibited.356
In South Africa, although life sentences are constitutional, the South
African Constitutional Court has specified that any “attempt to justify any
period of penal incarceration, let alone imprisonment for life . . . , without
inquiring into the proportionality between the offence and the period of
imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of
human dignity.”357 In other decisions, the South African Constitutional Court
has connected human dignity to ubuntu, a native African concept that also
informed the R2R Committee’s conceptualization of the right to
redemption. 358 The court explains that “[g]enerally, ubuntu translates as
humaneness.” 359 The concept is grounded in the collective recognition of

351 Id. ¶¶ 20, 22–23. Specifically, the court analyzed whether LWOP ran afoul of the guarantee
against inhuman and degrading treatment in Article 8(2)(b) of the Namibian constitution.
352 Prisons Act 8 of 1959 (as amended by Act 13 of 1981), Section 67(1); Republic of Namibia,
STAT. ANN. art. 140(5). Prior to the founding of Namibia in 1990, the territory now known as Namibia
was under the control of South Africa.
353 CONSTITUTION OF ANGOLA, art. 66(1), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_
2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CDT-KWVE].
354 Angolan Penal Code, art. 43(2), http://www.saflii.org/ao/legis/num_act/cp76.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3WKX-D8TU].
355 CONSTITUTION OF CAPE VERDE, art. 31, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Cape_Verde_1992.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VP4-L4LS].
356 CONSTITUTION OF MOZAMBIQUE, art. 61(1), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Mozambique_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJN7-Z4XF].
357 Dodo v. State 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) ¶ 38 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/
2001/16.html [https://perma.cc/4KUJ-NHEM].
358 State v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) ¶ 225 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACC/1995/3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM85-EVUP].
359 Id. at ¶ 308.
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group solidarity and the interdependence of the members of a community.360
It turns on the coexistence of the rights and duties of the individual alongside
the communitarian rights of duties of society.361 The court has concluded that
“[t]reatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu.”362
D. A Redemptive Reading of the Eighth Amendment
Taken together with the human rights law described in Part II, this
comparative constitutional law provides the legal basis for redeeming justice
in the United States. Through a human rights pragmatist approach to human
dignity, reading the right to redemption into Eighth Amendment evaluations
of cruel and usual punishment is conceivable. As Professor David Luban
explained, a human rights pragmatist—looking to the case law holding that
LWOP violates human dignity—would make a material inference from the
features that distinguish LWOP from other life sentences, namely the
impossibility of review and release, to understand what human dignity
requires.363 At a minimum, this approach would lead us to the conclusion that
LWOP infringes on human dignity because the sentence “presumes that
atonement and development of the [individual]’s personality are
impossible.”364 Read in this light, the global “trend towards placing more
emphasis on rehabilitation” is quite consequential.365 The fact that the United
States is one of the rare countries that employs LWOP—with no escape valve
whatsoever—should raise considerable concerns about its habitual use. 366
Like most jurisdictions across the globe that consider life sentences with no
mechanism for review and release to be cruel and unusual, the state courts
and legislatures in the United States should adopt the redemptive principles
described above to ensure a possibility of review and prospect of release to
forestall DBI.367 In particular in cases involving juveniles, states have broad
discretion to adopt review mechanisms that comport with the right to
redemption in light of Jones v. Mississippi, which specified that the Court’s
decision did not “preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing

360

Id. at ¶¶ 224, 308.
Id. at ¶ 224.
362 Id. at ¶ 225.
363 Luban, supra note 298, at 275.
364 Id.
365 Harakchiev v. Bulgaria, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, 445.
366 DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 22, at 25; Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted
Punishment, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1111–21 (2013).
367 See DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 22, at 71; ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH
PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 486 (2015).
361
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limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder . . .
[including] substantive appellate review of life-without-parole sentences.”368
As a baseline, a redemptive reading of the Eighth Amendment would
incorporate the progression principle described in Part II. Instead of
penological justifications being frozen in time, sentences would need to be
reviewed regularly to assess the evolving justifications for confinement. In
line with the margin of appreciation granted to states under international
human rights law, the review could take a number of forms, including parole
or clemency.
Regardless of the form, any review process must follow the same
human rights standards set out in Part III. First, the process must include a
level of legal certainty such that those serving life sentences know what they
must do to be considered for release. To accomplish this, the process must
be transparent, follow clearly established criteria, and not be arbitrary. In the
context of clemency, this means that the executive branch’s discretion to
grant or deny release cannot be unfettered. Second, the process must provide
a realistic possibility of release based on rehabilitation.369 In other words, it
cannot be a review in name only; it must be meaningful. This understanding
accords with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham, which
stipulated that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime . . . [but must] give
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 370 Guaranteeing a
human right to redemption extends this opportunity to all people, not just
juveniles who have committed nonhomicide crimes. Third, the review must
be regular, to ensure that sentences do not become excessive the longer they
endure. If penological justifications are lacking, then under the Eighth
Amendment, release would be required. At its essence, the progression
principle under human rights law mandates that the state revisit life sentences
to ensure that the initial reason for punishment still holds and that the
sentence should not be altered due to the individual’s rehabilitation. When
there is no way to reconsider a sentence in light of the changed circumstances
of the individual, punishment becomes cruel and unusual.

368

141 S. Ct. 1307, 1323 (2021).
As underscored by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, “The concept of rehabilitation
is imprecise; and its utility and proper implementation are the subject of a substantial, dynamic field of
inquiry and dialogue.” 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010). For this reason, a full definition of what it means to be
rehabilitated and how to determine rehabilitation is beyond the scope of this Article.
370 Id. at 75.
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CONCLUSION
As calls to reimagine the U.S. criminal legal system abound, the
concepts and principles discussed in this Article are timelier than ever. Many
yearn for a justice that facilitates healing and human development, rather
than employs incarceration as the solution to all societal harms. A criminal
legal system driven by vengeance, stereotypes, and oversimplification of the
human condition will not suffice. Restructuring it will require adopting legal
principles to guide visions of a more just society and a legal system to match.
The right to redemption outlined here provides one blueprint for
escaping our carceral default. We have started with DBI, but that is just the
beginning. Redemptive justice stretches much further. Accepting the
principle that all people have the capacity to evolve and change has farreaching implications. It will require recognition of redeeming stories, like
ours, which too often go untold. It will require a searching justice that
restores hope and upholds human dignity. Fundamentally, redemptive justice
holds space for complexity, invests in human potential, and replaces shallow
vindication with deeply rooted healing.
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